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Going Retro: Abolition For All 
Kevin Barry* 
The opening of the twenty-first century has seen a flurry of death 
penalty repeals.  This development is encouraging, but only partly so.  
Amidst the cheers for abolition, there is an unfairness of the highest 
order: the maintenance of the death penalty for some, but not others, for 
no other reason than the date of their crimes.  State legislatures are 
repealing the death penalty prospectively only, and these states’ 
executive branches are leaving their prisoners on death row.  In New 
Mexico and Connecticut, a total of thirteen prisoners remain on death 
row after those states abolished the death penalty. 
Some states, however, are “going retro.”  In 2012, California’s 
Proposition 34 would have applied retroactively, reducing over 700 
death row prisoners’ sentences to life without parole (“LWOP”).  More 
states should attempt to pass retroactive death penalty repeals, but they 
are not doing so, for two reasons.  The first is political: legislators are 
not pursuing retroactive legislation because they do not have the votes.  
The second reason is legal: legislators are not pursuing retroactive 
legislation because they believe that the separation of powers and state 
constitutional prohibitions on retroactive laws forbid it.  These 
arguments are reasonable ones, and they reach far beyond the death 
penalty sphere—to retroactive crack sentencing laws and retroactive 
juvenile LWOP sentencing laws, among others. 
This Article argues that neither the separation of powers nor state 
constitutional prohibitions on retroactive laws prohibits states from 
retroactively repealing their death penalties.  While politics may 
 
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law.  This Article is the third in a series 
of articles examining the gradual abolition of the death penalty in the twenty-first century.  See 
Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829 (2014); Kevin Barry, From Wolves, 
Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 313 (2014); see also Second Supplemental Brief of the Defendant with Attached 
Appendix at 1, Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 (No. 17413), 2013 WL 5776219, at *1 (responding to draft 
version of articles).  Thanks to Harold Krent, David Mitchell, and Linda Meyer for thoughtful 
comments on earlier drafts.  Thanks also to participants at the Faculty Forum at Quinnipiac 
University School of Law for helpful conversations, and to Adam Tusia for research assistance. 
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prevent legislatures from pursuing retroactive repeal of the death 
penalty, the law should not.  As California’s 2012 repeal bill makes 
clear, “fairness, equality, and uniformity” demand retroactivity.  They 
demand abolition for all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The death penalty is in rapid decline.  Over the past eight years, five 
states have repealed the death penalty.1  Never before in history have 
such a large number of states abolished the death penalty in so short a 
time.2  From coast to coast, abolition shows no signs of abating.  In 
2012, California, the largest state in the union and a death penalty 
bellwether, narrowly missed repealing its death penalty by a 53%–47% 
vote of the electorate.3  In 2014, New Hampshire, the only retentionist 
 
1. The states that legislatively repealed the death penalty are: New Jersey (2007), New Mexico 
(2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013).  See infra notes 7–10 and 
accompanying text.  New York abolished its death penalty in 2007 by court decision and 
legislative inaction.  See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 978 (N.Y. 2007) (vacating sentence 
of only remaining death row prisoner and stating that “[People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 
2004)] made perfectly clear that the death penalty sentencing statute crafted by the Legislature 
was unconstitutional”). 
2. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN AGENDA 29 (1986) (illustrating abolition of death penalty in United States from 
1840–1980). 
3. In 1972, in the watershed case of Furman v. Georgia, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled the death penalty unconstitutional as applied, Justice Blackmun mused that the Court was 
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state in New England, missed repealing the death penalty by one vote in 
the state senate.4  And more states await a vote as momentum builds in 
Delaware, Kansas, Colorado, Washington, and elsewhere.5 
What is perhaps most interesting about death penalty abolition in the 
twenty-first century is not the sheer number of states that are repealing 
the death penalty, but the way in which they are doing it.  Every state 
with the death penalty has prisoners on death row,6 which creates a 
conundrum for legislators: What to do about them?  A legislature might 
repeal the death penalty prospectively and retroactively, thereby 
abolishing the death penalty for everyone, including those currently on 
death row.  Alternatively, a legislature might repeal the death penalty 
prospectively only, thereby limiting repeal to future crimes and 
retaining death row intact. 
Over the past eight years, nearly all state legislatures considering 
repeal have responded to this conundrum by seeking to abolish the 
death penalty prospectively only.  New Mexico repealed prospectively 
only in 2009, leaving two prisoners on death row.7  Illinois abolished 
prospectively only in 2011, but its governor immediately commuted the 
sentences of those remaining on death row.8  Connecticut followed suit 
in 2012 and now has eleven prisoners on death row, including one man, 
Richard Rozkowski, who committed his crime before repeal but was not 
sentenced to death until after repeal.9  Maryland repealed prospectively 
 
“somewhat propelled toward its result by the interim decision of the California Supreme Court, 
with one justice dissenting, that the death penalty is violative of that State’s constitution.”  
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing People v. 
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972)). 
4. New Hampshire Retains Death Penalty on Tie Vote, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5749 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
5. See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (discussing death penalty repeal legislation). 
6. Compare States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 30, 2015), 
with Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015). 
7. New Mexico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-mexico-1 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
8. Illinois, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/illinois-1 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
9. Connecticut, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR,, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/connecticut-1 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015); Daniel Tepfer, Rozkowski Sentenced to Death, CT POST, 
http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Roszkowski-sentenced-to-death-5498444.php (last updated 
May 22, 2014, 10:41 PM) (discussing sentencing of Rozkowski to death on May 22, 2014 for 
2006 triple murder).  In 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court overturned the death sentence of 
Eduardo Santiago on grounds that the trial court had improperly failed to disclose privileged 
records regarding abuse and neglect of Mr. Santiago’s siblings.  State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 
653–54 (Conn. 2012).  Following remand to the trial court for a new penalty phase hearing, Mr. 
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only in 2013, leaving five prisoners on death row.10  On January 20, 
2015, one day before leaving office, Governor Martin O’Malley 
commuted the sentences of Maryland’s four remaining death row 
inmates.11  And prospective-only legislation awaits in other states, 
including Kansas,12 Colorado,13 and Washington,14 as well as in New 
Hampshire15 and Delaware,16 both of which have expressly rejected 
provisions that would have applied their repeals retroactively.17 
 
Santiago argued that Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal prohibits the State from seeking the 
death penalty against him.  Supplemental Reply Brief of the Def. at 1–3, State v. Santiago, 49 
A.3d 566 (Conn. 2012) (No. 17413).  Mr. Santiago’s case is once again pending before the 
Connecticut Supreme Court.  Because Mr. Santiago is no longer on death row at the time of this 
writing, this Article does not include him within Connecticut’s death row population as a 
statistical matter. 
10. Maryland, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/maryland-1 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
11. Outgoing Gov. Martin O’Malley Officially Commutes Death Sentences, WBAL TV (Jan. 
20, 2015), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/outgoing-gov-martin-omalley-officially-commutes-death 
-sentences/30822092.  John Booth-El, a fifth man on death row at the time Maryland abolished 
the death penalty, died in prison in April 2014.  Jeff Barker & Jonathan Pitts, Demise of Death 
Row Inmate Rekindles Debate Over Capital Punishment, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:11 
PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-death-row-man-dies-20140 
428-story.html#page=1. 
12. See S.B. 126, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/
li/b2013_14/measures/documents/sb126_00_0000.pdf (proposing to repeal death penalty in 
Kansas prospectively). 
13. See H.B. 13-1264, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014), available at http://legiscan.com/
CO/text/HB1264/id/947306/Colorado-2014-HB1264-Introduced.pdf (proposing to repeal death 
penalty in Colorado prospectively). 
14. See H.B. 1739, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015), available at http://lawfilesext.leg. 
wa.gov/biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5639.pdf (proposing to repeal death penalty 
in Washington prospectively). 
15. See H.B. 1170-FN, 147th Legis. (N.H. 2014), available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh. 
us/legislation/2014/HB1170.pdf (proposing to repeal death penalty in New Hampshire 
prospectively). 
16. See S. 19, 147th Legis. (Del. 2013) available at http://votesmart.org/static/billtext/43 
299.pdf (proposing to repeal death penalty in Delaware prospectively). 
17. See Death Penalty Repeal Passes Delaware Senate; Defeated in Colorado, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislation-death-penalty-repeal-passes-
delaware-senate-defeated-colorado (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing passage of amendment 
striking language that would have applied repeal retroactively to eighteen prisoners on 
Delaware’s death row).  Compare H.B. 1170-FN, 147th Legis. (N.H. 2014), available at 
http://gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2014/HB1170.pdf, Floor Amendment to H.B. 1170-FN, 
2014-0916h, available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legilsation/amendments/2014-0916H.ht 
ml (proposing to retroactively apply repeal to “[a]ny person sentenced to death . . . for an offense 
committed prior to the effective date of the [a]ct”), and New Hampshire Retains Death Penalty on 
Tie Vote, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5749 (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (discussing rejection of amendment that would have applied repeal retroactively 
to New Hampshire’s one death row prisoner), with S. 19, 147th Legis. (Del. 2013), available at 
http://votesmart.org/static/billtext/43299.pdf, and Sen. Amendment No. 1 to Sen. Bill. No. 19, An 
Act to Amend Title 11 of the Delaware Code Relating to the Death Penalty, 147th Legis. (Del. 
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Death penalty abolition in the twenty-first century is “gradual” 
abolition.  In states like New Mexico, Connecticut, and many more to 
come, the death penalty will end when the last remaining death row 
prisoner in each of these states dies or is freed from death row.18 
The primary reason why states are repealing prospectively only is, 
not surprisingly, political.  While not all family members of murder 
victims support the death penalty, many do,19 and they can make 
passage of repeal difficult as a political matter.  Take, for example, 
Mark and Kathleen Bonistall, the parents of slain University of 
Delaware student, Lindsey Bonistall, who encouraged legislators to “do 
the right thing” by opposing repeal.20  “[D]on’t let the judicial process, 
our tragedy, trauma and pain to be in vain,” they wrote in a letter to 
legislators.21  Consider also the testimony of Sharon Ward Blickenstaff, 
whose elderly father was murdered in his home.22  In testimony 
opposing Maryland’s repeal, she told legislators that “the murder[er]’s 
victims are put into a situation where their cries of pain and pleas for 
mercy fall on uncaring ears.  Who stands for the true victims?  Who 
gives them a voice?  Who cares for the families of survivors?”23  Or the 
testimony of Dr. William Petit, whose two children and spouse were 
murdered during a home invasion, and who encouraged Connecticut 
legislators to vote against repeal because “some crimes are so 
outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the 
wrong-doer deserves it . . . .”24  In this climate, it may be impossible for 
 
2013) (amending Senate Bill 19 by striking retroactive language stating that “[a]ny person who 
has been sentenced to death prior to the effective date of this act shall instead be punished by 
imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of probation or parole 
or any other reduction.”). 
18. Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment Case for 
Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1831–32 (2014) [hereinafter 
Barry, Part II]. 
19. See infra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (discussing murder victims’ family 
members who support death penalty). 
20. Kara Nuzback, Senate Approves Death Penalty Repeal, CAPE GAZETTE OF LEWES, DEL., 
Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.smalltownnews.com/article.php?catname=Crime&pub=Cape%20Ga 
zette&aid=136665. 
21. Id. 
22. Testimony of Sharon Ward Blickenstaff, Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment 3–4 (Aug. 
27 2008), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/blicken 
staff-testimony.pdf. 
23. Id. at 4. 
24. See Press Release, State of Conn. Exec. Chambers, Governor Rell Vetoes HB 6578, An 
Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony (June 5, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/
governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=3675&Q=441204 (reciting Dr. Petit’s quotation of Lord Justice 
Denning, Master of the Rolls of the Court of Appeals in the United Kingdom); see also Barry, 
Part II, supra note 18 (“Kansas legislature introduced prospective-only repeal bill at urging of 
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legislatures to pass a retroactive bill.  Faced with the option of repealing 
prospectively only or not at all, legislatures are choosing the former out 
of political necessity. 
As indicated by the number of states that have recently repealed the 
death penalty or are on the cusp of repeal, prospective-only repeal is 
sound strategy.  It is also good law.  Indeed, every court to have 
addressed the question has upheld the validity of prospective-only death 
penalty repeal.  In 1908, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that 
prospective-only repeal of the death penalty did not apply retroactively 
to a defendant who committed his offense three months before repeal.25  
And in 1917, the Supreme Court of Missouri likewise held that 
prospective-only repeal did not apply retroactively to a defendant who 
was sentenced to death three months before passage of the repeal.26  
“Undoubtedly the Legislature in 1917 had the power to abolish capital 
punishment as to all offenses, whether committed before or after the 
enactment of the new law,” the court stated, “but it did not do so.”27 
More recently, in 2010, a New Mexico trial court similarly held that 
New Mexico’s 2009 prospective-only repeal did not apply retroactively 
to a defendant who committed his crime three years before passage of 
the repeal.28  “‘I don’t find anything about [prospective-only repeal] 
unconstitutional,’” concluded Judge Neil Candelaria.29  “‘It’s the 
Legislature’s prerogative to make a law prospective or retroactive.’”30  
And on October 18, 2013, Maryland trial court judge Thomas G. Ross 
found that Maryland’s prospective-only repeal did not invalidate the 
death sentence of Jody Lee Miles, who was convicted and sentenced 
before the passage of Maryland’s repeal.31  On November 25, 2013, 
Maryland’s high court, the Court of Appeals, declined to address the 
validity of Maryland’s prospective-only repeal.32  However, the court 
 
legislators who refused to vote for bill that would clear death row, largely in response to brothers 
Reginald and Jonathan Carr’s murder, assault, rape, and robbery of five people.”). 
25. In re Schneck, 96 P. 43, 44 (Kan. 1908). 
26. State v. Lewis, 201 S.W. 80, 85–86 (Mo. 1918) (per curium); accord. State v. Hill, 201 
S.W. 58, 61 (Mo. 1918) (holding that statute abolishing death penalty, which became operative 
on June 18, 1917, did not apply where “trial and conviction was had in May, 1917”). 
27. Lewis, 201 S.W. at 85. 
28. Scott Sandlin, Astorga Death Penalty Trial Can Proceed, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 3, 2010, 
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/032332537958newsmetro12-03-10.htm. 
29. Id. (quoting District Judge Neil Candelaria). 
30. Id. (quoting District Judge Neil Candelaria).  Because a jury subsequently sentenced the 
defendant to life imprisonment without parole (as opposed to death), the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico did not have occasion to directly address this issue. 
31. See Brief of Appellee at 6, Miles v. State (Md. Nov. 6, 2012) (No. 2155), available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/11_6_14_Miles_COSA_Appeals_Brief.pdf. 
32. See Miles v. State, 80 A.3d 242, 266 (2013). 
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strongly signaled its validity, noting that the repeal did not reduce 
Miles’s death sentence as Miles’s attorneys argued.33  As these cases 
demonstrate, it is perfectly constitutional for state legislatures to make 
eligibility for death turn on the date of one’s crime.34 
Although politics is the primary reason why states are repealing 
prospectively only, it is not the only reason.  Some state legislatures are 
pursuing prospective-only bills because they believe that repealing the 
death penalty retroactively may be unconstitutional.  They believe that 
the reduction of existing death sentences—whether final or pending 
further appeal—may violate constitutional principles.  Specifically, 
these legislators have expressed concern that retroactive bills are 
prohibited by the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
judiciary, the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
executive, and state constitutional prohibitions on retroactive laws.35 
 
33. See id. (“[W]e do not reach Miles’s supplementally briefed argument that the legislative 
repeal of the death penalty demonstrates that the death penalty is not necessary for the safety of 
the State.”); id. at 244 n.2 (stating that Maryland’s prospective-only repeal “does not moot this 
appeal” and that the repeal “authorize[es] the Governor to ‘change a sentence of death into a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole,’ but, as of this writing, that provision has not 
been invoked”).  In November 2014, in a case before Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals, 
Maryland Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler stipulated that executing Miles post-repeal would 
violate due process based on the fact that Maryland’s death row protocols were invalidated in 
2006.  Justin Fenton, Gansler Argues that State Must Vacate Sentences of Death Row Inmates, 
BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 6, 2014, 8:55 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/ 
crime/blog/bs-md-death-row-appeal-20141106-story.html#page=1 (discussing appeal of death 
row inmate Jody Lee Miles, pending before Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals).  Importantly, 
the State of Maryland did not argue that prospective-only repeal was unconstitutional.  According 
to the State, it was Maryland’s lack of protocols—not prospective-only repeal, in and of itself—
that raised due process concerns.  See Brief of Appellee at 6, 24–28, supra note 31 (“Miles’s 
sentence is not illegal—either when it was handed down in 1998 or now—and his claims in 
support of his motion to correct an illegal sentence have no merit.”). 
34. On September 12, 2012, in the case of State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
became the first high court in nearly a century to take up this issue.  See State v. Santiago, SC 
17413, http://appellateinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail.aspx?CRN=11507&Type=CaseName. At the 
time of this writing, nearly two years after oral argument on April 23, 2013, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court has not issued an opinion.  Id.  An identical legal challenge is pending before 
New Mexico’s high court.  Barry Massey, New Mexico High Court to Hear Death-Row Appeals, 
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.santafenewmexican.com 
/news/local_news/new-mexico-high-court-to-hear-death-row-appeals/article_1464a27d-f25d-5fea 
-8155-25e9a5347dca.html (discussing appeals of death-row inmates Timothy Allen and Robert 
Fry, pending before New Mexico Supreme Court).  Odds are good that both high courts will 
likewise uphold prospective-only death penalty repeal.  See generally Kevin Barry, From Wolves, 
Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 313 (2014) [hereinafter Barry, Part I] (arguing that prospective-only death penalty 
repeal does not violate Eighth Amendment); Barry, Part II, supra note 18 (arguing that 
prospective-only death penalty repeal does not violate Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses). 
35. According to New Mexico State Representative Gail Chasey, the New Mexico 
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These concerns are reasonable.  None, however, should prevent state 
legislatures from repealing the death penalty retroactively.  None should 
prevent the legislature from eliminating an unfairness of the highest 
order: the execution of one but not another for no other reason than the 
date of the crime.36  With proper drafting, retroactive repeal, like 
prospective-only repeal, is almost certainly valid as a matter of 
constitutional law.37  If retroactive repeal proves politically impossible 
 
legislature’s decision not to pursue a retroactive bill was based on, among other things, New 
Mexico’s constitutional savings clause, which prohibits a new law from extinguishing penalties, 
rights, and liabilities under a prior law.  N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 33–34.  Likewise, the Maryland 
legislators’ decision not to pursue a retroactive bill “was a combination of constitutional concerns 
[that the bill] . . . would constitute a violation of the separation of powers and throw the whole bill 
into doubt . . . and political concerns (the issue would be all about the particular cases).”  Email 
from Jamie Raskin, Maryland Senate, to Kevin Barry, Prof., Quinn. Univ. Sch. Law (June 9, 
2014) (notes on file with author).  And advocates in Illinois similarly stated that Illinois decided 
not to pursue a retroactive bill in 2011, in part, because “we concluded that a retrospective 
abolition bill would be unconstitutional.  We didn’t think the legislature had any authority to 
vacate an already court-imposed sentence, under the separation of powers provision of our state 
constitution.”  E-mail from Confidential Source, Ill., to Kevin Barry, Prof., Quinn. Univ. Sch. 
Law (July 18, 2013) (on file with author).  Connecticut legislators did not share these concerns.  
See Barry, Part II, supra note 18, at 1836–37 (stating that motivation for prospective-only bill 
was purely political). 
36. For purposes of this article, the normative value of eliminating sentencing disparities 
created by prospective-only repeal of the death penalty is assumed.  For more on this issue, see 
Barry, Part II, supra note 18 (discussing disproportionality of imposing death penalty on those 
who committed crime before repeal and not those who committed identical crimes after repeal).  
For thoughtful discussions of this issue in the non-capital context, see Dorean M. Koenig, 
Advocating Consistent Sentencing of Prisoners: Deconstructing the Michigan Myth That 
Retroactive Application of Lesser Penalties for Crimes Violates the Governor’s Power of 
Commutation, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61, 64 (1999) (“The preeminent value of consistent 
sentencing lies in its sense of justice and proportionality.  Teaching the fair application of the 
laws, by making certain that prison sentences are fairly and evenly applied, is held to be 
important for generating respect for the law and the rule of law.  It makes no sense to have one 
prisoner sentenced to a mandatory forty-years imprisonment being bunked two years later with a 
very similar prisoner who is serving a twenty-year mandatory term for the same exact offense.”); 
Harold J. Krent, Retroactivity and Crack Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 53, 64 
(2013) (“These three related fundamental concerns—honoring reliance interests, imposing rule of 
law constraints on legislatures, and valuing certainty—largely are absent when Congress 
ameliorates the severity of prior penalties or decriminalizes conduct altogether.”); S. David 
Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old: Expanding the Scope of Retroactive Amelioration, 
37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2009) (“Withholding a lesser punishment from a pre- or post-final 
judgment defendant is contrary to consequentialist and retributivist justifications for punishment 
because the ameliorative legislative change reflects the legislature’s assessment that the prior 
penalty is no longer an adequate deterrence or an appropriate penalty.”).  See generally Comment, 
Today’s Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal 
Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 120, 148 (1972), cited in Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 
605 (1973), and Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (discussing 
“the seemingly arbitrary decisions reached by the courts” in cases involving “an individual who 
commits a criminal act prior to a mitigatory change which precedes his apprehension, trial, or 
completion of sentence”). 
37. See infra Part VI (discussing model retroactivity language). 
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in a given state, the legislature should follow the current trend of 
abolishing prospectively only.  Repeal for some is better than repeal for 
none.  If, however, a state legislature has the votes to repeal the death 
penalty prospectively and retroactively, it should do so.  California is a 
case in point. 
In 2012, California narrowly missed becoming not only the largest 
state in the union to abolish the death penalty, but also the first state in 
nearly fifty years to do so retroactively.38  In order to “achieve fairness, 
equality and uniformity in sentencing,” California’s Proposition 34 
would have reduced the death sentences of over 700 death row prisoners 
to life without parole (“LWOP”).39  That Proposition failed by just three 
percent of the electorate.40  California’s retroactivity provision 
underscores the importance of retroactive repeal to this century’s 
abolition effort.41  Every remaining state with the death penalty has 
 
38. California Retains Death Penalty by Narrow Margin, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/california-retains-death-penalty-narrow-margin (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015).  Nebraska’s pending death penalty repeal bill is also retroactive.  See L. 543, § 
21, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/ 
Current/PDF/Intro/LB543.pdf (“In any criminal proceeding in which the death penalty has been 
imposed but not carried out prior to the effective date of this act, it is the intent of the Legislature 
that such penalty shall be changed to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.”). 
39. The SAFE California Act § 10(a)–(b), in California General Election Tuesday, November 
6, 2012: Official Voter Information Guide 95, 96 (2012), available at http://vig.cdn.so 
s.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop34 (“In any case where a 
defendant or inmate was sentenced to death prior to the effective date of this act, the sentence 
shall automatically be converted to imprisonment in the state prison for life without the 
possibility of parole . . . .”).  For more information on Proposition 34, see generally Judge Arthur 
L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Costs of Capital Punishment in California: Will Voters Choose 
Reform This November?, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221 (2012); Hadar Aviram & Ryan Newby, 
Death Row Economics the Rise of Fiscally Prudent Anti-Death Penalty Activism, 28 CRIM. JUST. 
33, 39–40 (2013). 
40. California Retains Death Penalty by Narrow Margin, supra note 38. 
41. Although California and Nebraska’s legislation represents the most recent attempts to 
abolish the death penalty retroactively, see supra note 38 and accompanying text, they are not the 
first.  New Jersey’s 2007 repeal law contained a retroactivity provision that required courts to 
reduce the sentences of death row prisoners to LWOP on the condition that such prisoners waived 
any further appeals.  See Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, § 2, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427, 1429–30, 
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL07/204_.PDF (“An inmate sentenced to 
death prior to the date of the enactment of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court and 
waiver of any further appeals related to sentencing, shall be resentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.  Such sentence shall be 
served in a maximum security prison.  Any such motion to the sentencing court shall be made 
within 60 days of the enactment of this act.  If the motion is not made within 60 days the inmate 
shall remain under the sentence of death previously imposed by the sentencing court.”).  Because 
New Jersey’s governor commuted all existing death sentences immediately prior to the effective 
date of the law (apparently, in response to the due process concerns of death row prisoners who 
refused to waive further appeals on grounds that they were innocent of any crime), the law’s 
retroactivity provision became moot.  North Dakota and West Virginia appear to be the only two 
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prisoners on death row; state legislatures should carefully consider 
California’s example before writing those prisoners out of repeal 
legislation.42 
Significantly, the constitutionality of retroactive repeal has 
implications beyond the death penalty context.  In 2014, Congress 
introduced the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, which would reduce the 
final sentences of tens of thousands of crack cocaine offenders.43  And a 
number of state laws passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Miller v. Alabama permit courts to reduce the final 
sentences of prisoners who were mandatorily sentenced to LWOP for 
crimes committed as juveniles.44  This important legislation raises the 
very same constitutional questions as retroactive death penalty repeal. 
This Article considers each of the constitutional arguments against 
retroactive death penalty repeal and concludes that none should prevent 
legislators from retroactively repealing the death penalty.  In sum, the 
law permits retroactive repeal of the death penalty and, as California’s 
Proposition 34 makes clear, “fairness, equality, and uniformity” demand 
it.  Hopefully, more states will follow California’s lead: Abolition for 
all. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Parts I and II introduce the concepts 
of retroactive legislation and the separation of powers, respectively.  At 
the heart of this Article are Parts III, IV, and V, which turn to each of 
the three primary constitutional arguments against retroactive death 
 
states that actually abolished their death penalties retroactively.  See Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, 
§ 1, 1915 N.D. Laws 76, 76 (“Every person who has been or may be hereafter convicted of 
murder in the first degree shall be punished by confinement at hard labor in the State Penitentiary 
for life.”); Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 203, 207 (“[N]o person . . . shall be 
executed, irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction had, or the sentence 
imposed, before or after the enactment of this section.”).  Because these laws were apparently 
never challenged in court (in fact, it is unclear whether there were prisoners on death row to 
challenge them), these laws provide little guidance in analyzing the constitutionality of retroactive 
repeal—other than demonstrating legislatures’ willingness to pass such repeals.  See supra notes 
15–17 and accompanying text (discussing retroactive death penalty-repeal efforts in New 
Hampshire and Delaware); see also Barry, Part I, supra note 34 (discussing statutes in 
Mississippi, Idaho, and New Mexico, which retroactively altered death penalty procedures or 
repealed death penalty for certain crimes). 
42. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015). 
43. See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. § 3(b) (2014), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410/text. 
44. See JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES TO 
2012 SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 3 (2014) (“Of the 13 states that 
have passed legislation, only four – Delaware, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming – 
allow for resentencing among the current JLWOP population.”). 
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penalty repeal.  Specifically, Part III argues that the reduction of final 
death sentences does not offend the separation of powers by interfering 
with the final judgments of courts, and it distinguishes cases holding to 
the contrary.  Even if the separation of powers prohibits the legislature 
from requiring courts to reopen final judgments, Part III argues, it does 
not prohibit the legislature from merely authorizing such legislation. 
Part IV argues that the reduction of final sentences does not offend 
the separation of powers by interfering with the executive’s 
commutation authority.  Although a majority of jurisdictions have held 
that sentence reduction is the same as commutation and therefore 
violates the separation of powers, the better argument is the minority 
view, which holds that sentence reduction is different from 
commutation in both purpose and effect, and is therefore constitutional.  
Part V argues that retroactive death penalty repeal does not offend state 
constitutional savings clauses and retroactivity clauses.  To the extent 
that these clauses facially apply to ameliorative criminal laws, they have 
not prevented legislatures from passing legislation that retroactively 
reduced penalties, nor have they prevented courts from upholding such 
legislation. 
Having canvassed the various constitutional concerns with retroactive 
death penalty repeal, Part VI provides four model statutory provisions 
for state legislatures to consider in abolishing the death penalty 
retroactively.  Drawn from federal and state capital and non-capital 
legislation, these provisions can help avoid the constitutional infirmities 
endemic to retroactive legislation.  Part VII offers some concluding 
remarks. 
I.  RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION, GENERALLY 
Retroactive legislation refers to legislation “that prescribes what the 
law was at an earlier time, when the act whose effect is controlled by 
the legislation occurred.”45  Although determining when legislation 
operates retroactively “is not always a simple or mechanical task,”46 
 
45. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225 (1995); see Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (stating that legislation operates retroactively when “the new 
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment”); cf. 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 31 (1981) (stating that, in order for a more onerous criminal 
law to be considered ex post facto, “it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment. . . .  The critical question is whether the law changes the legal 
consequences of acts completed before its effective date.”); id. (stating that “it is the effect, not 
the form, of the law” that determines whether it is retrospective and therefore ex post facto). 
46. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 (“Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in 
hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect 
philosophical clarity.”); see id. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not maintain that it will 
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some straightforward examples from the civil and criminal contexts will 
suffice.  In the civil context, consider an amendment to the Bankruptcy 
Act that gives priority to certain personal injury claims “now or 
hereafter pending in any court in the United States.”47  If the new law is 
retroactive, a person whose pending personal injury claim had no 
priority under the old law could claim priority under the new.48  In the 
criminal context, a new law might reduce the sentence for certain 
criminal acts, or it might decriminalize such acts altogether.49  If the 
new law were retroactive, a person who committed a crime under the 
old law would be entitled to the benefit of the new law—a reduced 
sentence or no conviction at all.50 
Given “[t]he Legislature’s unmatched powers . . . to sweep away 
settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration,” 
retroactive legislation “raise[s] particular concerns.”51  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that 
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to 
 
always be easy to determine, from the statute’s purpose, the relevant event for assessing its 
retroactivity.”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 857 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“It will remain difficult, in many cases, to decide . . . whether a particular 
application [of new legislation] is retroactive.”). 
47. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U.S. 23, 26 (1940). 
48. See id. at 27 (holding that retroactive amendment to statute applied to case pending on 
appeal, regardless of whether lower court’s ruling was correct when it applied prior version of 
statute); see also Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160, 162 (1864) (upholding new jurisdictional 
statute that explicitly applied to all cases “pending” on appeal from the territory of Nevada at the 
time Nevada achieved statehood); id. at 174–75 (“It is well settled that where there is no direct 
constitutional prohibition, a State may pass retrospective laws, such as, in their operation, may 
affect suits pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not previously possess, or modify 
an existing remedy, or remove an impediment in the way of legal proceedings.”); United States v. 
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 107 (1801) (applying new treaty to case pending on 
appeal where treaty unambiguously applied to pending cases). 
49. See Comment, supra note 36, at 131–41 (discussing retroactive application of ameliorative 
criminal statutes that reduce sentences or decriminalize previously criminal conduct). 
50. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 154 (Idaho 2008) (giving retroactive effect in 
pending case to statute requiring new procedures for “any capital sentencing proceeding 
occurring after the effective date of this act, including those cases where the murder for which 
sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective date of this act and including those cases 
where a first-degree murder conviction or death sentence occurring before the effective date of 
this act has been set aside and the case is before the court for retrial or resentencing”); Watts v. 
State, 733 So. 2d 214, 237 (Miss. 1999) (giving retroactive effect in pending case to statute 
requiring jury to consider life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as sentencing option 
in “any case in which pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994,” 
and stating that the fact that defendant’s crime occurred several months before effective date of 
statute was “immaterial”); State v. Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 205 (N.M. 1969) (per curium) 
(supplemental opinion) (giving retroactive effect in pending case to statute “provid[ing] for 
revocation of death penalties already imposed and substitution of a sentence of life 
imprisonment”). 
51. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266. 
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conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be 
lightly disrupted.”52  For this reason, “a presumption against retroactive 
legislation” (with some exceptions53) has long prevailed in the civil 
context.54 
In the criminal context, courts’ treatment of retroactive legislation is 
more nuanced.  To begin with, retroactive criminal legislation that is 
more burdensome than prior law is not simply presumptively 
prohibited; it is constitutionally barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.55  
By contrast, retroactive criminal legislation that is ameliorative—for 
example, legislation that reduces sentences for various crimes—was 
favored at common law.56  Under the common-law doctrine of 
“abatement,” there was a presumption in favor of the retroactivity of 
 
52. Id. at 265; see id. at 270 (“The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently 
been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the 
fact.”); see also Comment, supra note 36, at 120 (“[J]udicial and legislative concern that 
retroactive laws are characterized by lack of notice, inadequate consideration of past conditions, 
and disruption of the security attaching to the finalization of past transactions.”). 
53. According to the Supreme Court, the presumption against retroactivity does not apply 
when the legislation: (1) explicitly authorizes retroactive application, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273; 
see, e.g., infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (discussing explicitly retroactive statutes); (2) 
“authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief,” Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
357 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Changing the rules governing future behavior . . . is a 
prospective application.  This is why, ‘[w]hen the intervening statute authorizes or affects the 
propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive.’” (citing 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273)); (3) confers or ousts jurisdiction, “whether or not jurisdiction lay 
when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed[,]” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 
(“Present law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes ‘speak to the 
power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” (citation omitted)); or 
(4) changes procedural rules; see id. at 275 (“Because rules of procedure regulate secondary 
rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct 
giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.” (citation 
omitted)). 
54. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply 
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. . . .  
[T]he ‘principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that 
existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.’” (quoting Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
56. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. App. 1996) (“Although nonpenal statutes 
traditionally operate prospectively, unless there is evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, an 
opposite presumption applies to repeals of criminal statutes.”); see Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270–71 
(“[A]t common law a contrary rule [favoring retroactivity] applied to statutes that merely 
removed a burden on private rights by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or civil); 
such repeals were understood to preclude punishment for acts antedating the repeal.”); Kaiser, 
494 U.S. at 841 n.1, 853 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing “presumption that statutes are not 
retroactive” in the civil context from “contrary presumption (i.e., a presumption of retroactivity)” 
in “the repeal of punishments”). 
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ameliorative criminal laws.57  Absent some expression of legislative 
intent to the contrary, the repeal or amendment of a criminal statute 
resulted in the termination of all prosecutions that had not yet resulted 
in a final sentence.58  According to the Supreme Court, 
By the repeal of [a criminal statute], without any reservation of its 
penalties, all criminal proceedings taken under it fall.  There can be no 
legal conviction, nor any valid judgment pronounced upon conviction, 
unless the law creating the offence be at the time in existence.  By the 
repeal the legislative will is expressed that no further proceedings be 
had under the act repealed.59 
But this common-law presumption in favor of retroactivity had 
unintended consequences.  Laws reducing criminal sentences for 
particular crimes had the effect of abating all pending prosecutions of 
those crimes, thereby allowing such crimes to go completely 
unpunished.60  “To avoid such results, legislatures frequently indicated 
an intention not to abate pending prosecutions by including in the 
repealing statute a specific clause”—a so-called “savings clause”—
 
57. See Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66 (“Although nonpenal statutes traditionally operate 
prospectively . . . an opposite presumption applies to repeals of criminal statutes.”); see also 
supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Landgraf and Kaiser).  The common-law 
doctrine of abatement was not, technically, the same as a presumption in favor of retroactivity.  
Abatement did not retroactively apply reduced sentences to pending cases—it terminated pending 
cases altogether. 
58. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 607 (1973) (“At common law, the repeal of a 
criminal statute abated all prosecutions which had not reached final disposition in the highest 
court authorized to review them.”); see Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66 (“At common law, such repealing 
legislation applied retroactively, abating every prosecution which had not yet resulted in final 
conviction (including appeal to the highest reviewing court)—unless a special provision had been 
enacted to save prosecutions under the repealed statute.”).  Common-law abatements were not 
limited to cases involving ameliorative legislative changes.  Abatements also took place where 
legislative changes retroactively increased penalties; such changes would have likely violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause had they not resulted in abatement.  See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 
660 (1974) (“Common-law abatements resulted . . . from repeals and re-enactments with different 
penalties, whether the re-enacted legislation increased or decreased the penalties.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66 (discussing Ex Post Facto Clause’s preclusion of 
prosecution under harsher statute); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 25 (discussing “technical 
abatements” of pending cases in light of more onerous legislative changes). 
59. United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 95 (1870); see Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 281, 283 (1809) (“[I]t has been long settled, on general principles, that after the 
expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations 
of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that 
purpose by statute.”). 
60. See Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66; accord. State v. Carpentino, 85 A.3d 906, 910 (N.H. 2014) 
(“[T]he theory of abatement carries an obvious potential for injustice: the prospect that crimes 
committed before the effective date of a statutory amendment would go entirely unpunished even 
though (as evidenced by the terms of the new legislation applicable prospectively) the legislature 
quite obviously had no intention of removing the conduct at issue from the ambit of the criminal 
law.”); see also Comment, supra note 36, at 125–26 (discussing abatement cases). 
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”stating that prosecutions of offenses under the repealed statute were 
not to be abated.”61  Nevertheless, through legislative inadvertence, 
savings clauses were sometimes left out of legislation, and so 
prosecutions continued to abate.62 
Beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress and 
state legislatures responded to this problem by passing general savings 
statutes that preserved or “saved” pending prosecutions under statutes 
that had been amended or repealed.63  The federal general savings 
statute, for example, states that: 
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or 
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such 
statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such 
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of 
sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of 
such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.64 
 Nearly all states have passed similar general savings statutes.65  
 
61. Bradley, 410 U.S. at 608. 
62. See Marrero, 417 U.S. at 660; see also Comment, supra note 36, at 126 (discussing 
legislative oversight that resulted in abatement). 
63. See Marrero, 417 U.S. at 660; United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 224 (1934) 
(stating that, by enacting federal general savings statute, Congress exercised “its undoubted 
authority to qualify its repeal and thus to keep in force its own enactments”).  “The majority of 
[general savings] statutes,” including the federal general savings statute, “apply in both civil and 
criminal actions.”  Comment, supra note 36, at 128; see Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 217–
18 (1910) (stating that federal general savings statute “is not alone applicable to penalties and 
forfeitures under penal statutes.  It extends as well to ‘liabilities,’ and a liability or obligation to 
pay a tax imposed under a repealed statute is not only within the letter, but the spirit and purpose, 
of the provision.”), cited favorably in Korshin v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 670, 673–74 (4th Cir. 1996). 
64. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).  “Case law makes clear that the word ‘repeal’ applies when a new 
statute simply diminishes the penalties that the older statute set forth.”  Dorsey v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2321, 2330–31 (2012).  “[P]enalties are ‘incurred’ under the older statute when an 
offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits the underlying conduct that makes the offender 
liable.”  Id. at 2331. 
65. See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 47–51 (compiling state savings statutes, but excluding 
Delaware and Minnesota); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 211 (Delaware savings statute); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 645.35 (1945) (Minnesota savings statute).  Ten states have passed 
ameliorative exceptions to their general savings statutes, which give retroactive effect to 
ameliorative legislative changes in pending cases.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 214(c) 
(1969) (“If the penalty or punishment for any offense is reduced by the amendment of an act or 
statutory provision, the same shall be imposed in accordance with the act or provision as amended 
unless imposed prior to the date of the amendment.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 36, at 47–51 
(compiling ameliorative exceptions).  Four states have savings clauses embodied in their 
constitutions—not in their statutes.  Id. (compiling constitutional savings clauses); see infra Part 
V (discussing state constitutional savings clauses).  Unlike federal courts, several state high 
courts have disregarded their general savings statutes and give retroactive effect to ameliorative 
legislative changes in pending cases.  See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d. 61, 74 (D.C. App. 
1996) (stating that some state supreme courts “have held a general savings statute inapplicable 
because it is ambiguous, or expressly is limited to preserving sentences already imposed, or is an 
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These general savings statutes, in effect, shift the legislative 
presumption regarding ameliorative criminal laws from one of 
retroactivity (through abatement) to one of non-retroactivity in the 
absence of contrary legislative direction.66  Therefore, absent explicit 
language to the contrary or some other “indicia of congressional 
intent,”67 ameliorative criminal legislation does not apply to those who 
commit their crimes prior to the effective date of the statute—even if 
they are tried, convicted, or sentenced, or if the sentence becomes final, 
after the effective date of the statute.68 
Importantly, the presumption against retroactivity in the civil and 
criminal contexts, as codified in general saving statutes, is a 
presumption only; it can be overcome by clear legislative intent to the 
contrary.69  If a statute explicitly states that it is retroactive—for 
 
optional canon of statutory construction, or must be construed by reference to legislative intent in 
other criminal statutes, or is relevant only to ‘technical abatements’ of an entire criminal offense” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
66. Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66–67 (“[Savings] statutes shift[] ‘the legislative presumption from 
one of abatement unless otherwise specified to one of non-abatement in the absence of contrary 
legislative direction.’” (quoting Comment, supra note 36, at 127)).  But see infra Part V 
(discussing constitutional savings clauses, which technically prohibit all retroactive legislation 
regardless of legislative intent). 
67. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2332; id. at 2331–32 (stating that, although the general savings 
statute “set[s] forth an important background principle of interpretation,” Congress remains free 
to disregard it “either expressly or by implication as it chooses”); see id. at 2340 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that where repeal is not explicit, “the implication from the subsequently 
enacted statute must be clear enough to overcome our strong presumption against implied 
repeals”). 
68. See Marrero, 417 U.S. at 661 (“[T]he saving clause has been held to bar application of 
ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at the time of the 
commission of an offense.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 
655 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that, “by default under the [federal] savings statute,” ameliorative 
statutory change “would not have applied to people who offended before the statute’s effective 
date, even those sentenced after the effective date”); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 72–74 (rejecting 
argument that federal general savings statute “is limited to preserving sentences already 
imposed”); cf. United States v. Baum, 74 F. 43, 46 (D. Utah 1896) (“The crime is complete as of 
the date of the criminal act, and, unless there be a remission, by the repeal of the only law which 
authorizes its punishment, or by direct pardon, such punishment may be inflicted.  This is shown 
by the admittedly valid statutes of the United States, and of most of the states, to the effect that 
such a repeal in criminal cases should not affect causes of prosecution already accrued.  Rev. St. 
U.S. Sec. 13.  Wherever there is such general saving [statute] . . . the authority to punish is still 
preserved, and the intent, otherwise inferable, that the repeal should operate as a remission of past 
offenses, is negatived [sic].”).  But cf. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335 (stating that, in non-capital 
cases involving application of federal sentencing guidelines, “the ordinary practice is to apply 
new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants 
already sentenced” (emphasis added)). 
69. E.g., Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2326, 2332 (stating that federal general savings statute “set[s] 
forth an important background principle of interpretation” by which the Court “must assume that 
Congress did not intend [newly reduced] penalties to apply [to pre-Act conduct] unless it clearly 
indicated to the contrary. . . . But we find that clear indication here.”); Landgraf v. USI Film 
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example, an ameliorative criminal statute that is to be applied 
“irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction had, 
or the sentence imposed, before or after” a date certain70—or if some 
other indicia of congressional intent suggests as much, then, as a matter 
of statutory construction, courts are duty-bound to give the statute 
retroactive effect.71 
This obligation to give retroactive effect to retroactive laws, however, 
is subject to an obvious and important limitation.  Courts will not give 
retroactive effect to retroactive laws if doing so would violate 
constitutional principles72—a qualification to which this Article now 
turns. 
II.  RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Although the legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws, its 
power is constrained by the separation-of-powers doctrine.73  To 
understand this constitutional limit on retroactive legislation, some brief 
background is instructive. 
The federal constitution does not explicitly mention the separation-
of-powers doctrine.74  The doctrine arises not from Article III or any 
 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (“If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional 
presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a 
result.”); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 79  (“[A]bsent an express provision specifying the class or classes 
to which the new sentencing scheme applies, we cannot conclude that, ‘obviously’ and inevitably, 
the legislature must have intended a retroactive, rather than a prospective, approach.”). 
70. Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 202, 207; see supra notes 41 and 49 
(discussing capital and non-capital ameliorative retroactive legislation); cf. OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2929.06(E) (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 47 of the 130th Gen. Assemb.) (stating that  
non-ameliorative statute making capital offenders eligible for a death sentence on resentencing 
“shall apply equally to all such offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after March 23, 2005, 
including offenders who, on March 23, 2005, are challenging their sentence of death and 
offenders whose sentence of death has been set aside, nullified, or vacated by any court of this 
state or any federal court but who, as of March 23, 2005, have not yet been resentenced”); State v. 
White, 972 N.E.2d 534, 543 (Ohio 2012) (“By enacting [§ 2929.06(E)], the General Assembly 
has clearly expressed its intent that [the statute making capital offenders eligible for a death 
sentence on resentencing] apply retroactively.”). 
71. Rules of statutory construction require that courts give effect to the plain language of a 
statute, provided that it does not lead to absurd results.  See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))). 
72. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (stating that court’s function is to enforce plain meaning of 
statute “if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it”). 
73. See Krent, supra note 36, at 66 (discussing separation of powers in context of retroactive 
legislation reducing drug sentences). 
74. 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE § 37:1, 
at 386 (3d ed. 2011). 
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other single provision of the Constitution, but rather from the 
organization of the Constitution, which sets forth three separate 
branches of government.75  In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 
“the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary 
construes the law.”76  Of course, the separation contemplated by the 
Constitution is not a rigid one, as exemplified by an elaborate system of 
checks and balances that “mak[e] the three branches of government to 
some extent interdependent.”77  As James Madison wrote, the 
separation of powers does “not mean that these departments ought to 
have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.”78 
There is widespread agreement that one of the basic principles behind 
the separation-of-powers doctrine is the protection of individual liberty 
and the “deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule.”79  In The Federalist 
No. 47, James Madison called the separation of powers an “essential 
precaution in favor of liberty,” and stated that “the accumulation of all 
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”80  Consistent with 
this animating principle, “[t]he Supreme Court Justices have repeatedly 
acknowledged that the separation of powers doctrine protects the liberty 
of the citizen from a dangerous accumulation of power in the trustees of 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 387–88 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825)). 
77. DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH WINGATE, FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 12 (2d ed. 2000).  Among these checks and balances are “bicameralism, 
presidential veto, impeachment, the Senate’s power to approve treaties, its ‘advise and consent’ 
power generally, the House of Representative’s special role as the originator of all revenue bills, 
and judicial review.” Id. at 8. 
78. Id. at 9 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 323–26) (emphasis added)).  It is only “where 
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole 
power of another department [that] the fundamental principles of a free constitution[] are 
subverted.”  Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 323–26); see Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S. 748, 773 (1996) (“Separation-of-powers principles are vindicated, not disserved, by 
measured cooperation between the two political branches of the Government, each contributing to 
a lawful objective through its own processes.”). 
79. See, e.g., Loving, 517 U.S. at 757; Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 
(1995) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also RICH, supra note 74, at 386 (discussing principal 
purposes behind Framers’ adoption of separation-of-powers doctrine). 
80. DOERNBERG & WINGATE, supra note 77, at 8 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 323–
26); see Separation of Powers—Congressional Authority to Reopen Final Judgments, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 229, 235 (1995) [hereinafter Final Judgments] (“Since the middle of the seventeenth 
century, numerous commentators have warned of the dangers arising from consolidated 
powers. . . .  Whereas the concentration of powers threatened to expose ‘the life and liberty of the 
subject . . . to arbitrary control,’ the separation of powers served to ‘save the people from 
autocracy.’” (quoting 1 CHARLES MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 174 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., 1949) (1748); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
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governance.”81 
Despite agreement over the separation of powers’ liberty-protecting 
objectives, there is much debate over the analytical approaches used by 
courts to protect liberty: broadly speaking, formalism v. 
functionalism.82  Formalists argue that individual liberty is best 
protected through a categorical, rule-bound approach.83  Under a 
formalist approach to retroactivity, for example, the finality of judicial 
decisions and the exclusivity of the executive’s pardon power serve as 
proxies for the preservation of liberty.84  Legislation that disrupts the 
finality of judicial decisions or resembles a pardon necessarily threatens 
liberty and therefore violates the separation of powers.85  For 
functionalists, by contrast, individual liberty is best protected by a more 
searching inquiry, one that balances the need for social change with the 
risk of harm to a specific liberty concern.86  Under a functionalist 
approach to retroactivity, legislation that reopens final judgments or 
resembles a pardon does not threaten liberty per se; a case-specific 
analysis of the legislation’s burden on individual liberty is required.87 
Importantly, the federal constitution “does not impose the doctrine of 
separation of powers upon the states.”88  Nevertheless, all fifty states 
divide power between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches,89 
 
81. RICH, supra note 74, at 387; see, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 241 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(stating that “protect[ion of] individual liberty” is a “basic ‘separation-of-powers’ principle”); 
Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was 
adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power.”). 
82. DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 (1996); see Adrian Vermeule, The 
Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 359, 363 (2000) 
(discussing formalism and functionalism in separation-of-powers context). 
83. See Vermeule, supra note 82, at 360, 362. 
84. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 (characterizing separation between legislature’s power to 
make law and judiciary’s power to render final judgments as “a prophylactic device, establishing 
high walls and clear distinctions”); see also Final Judgments, supra note 80, at 236 (“A 
fundamental premise of rule-based approaches is the notion that application of the rule generally 
effects the rationale behind it and thus dispenses with the need to apply the background rationale 
directly.”). 
85. Cf. Final Judgments, supra note 80, at 235–36 (arguing that, by failing to take into 
account the individual liberty concerns underlying the separation of powers, the separation of 
powers becomes an end in itself). 
86. See Vermeule, supra note 82, at 360, 363; Final Judgments, supra note 80, at 238. 
87. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., concurring) (balancing “risks of the very sort 
that our Constitution’s ‘separation-of-powers’ prohibition seeks to avoid” against “offsetting 
legislative safeguards that . . . offer assurances that minimize those risks”); see also Vermeule, 
supra note 82, at 360 (discussing functionalism’s case-specific balancing). 
88. RICH, supra note 74, at 389. 
89. Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial 
Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 963, 1013 n.108 (1994). 
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with most state constitutions containing specific separation-of-powers 
provisions.90  The Framers of the federal constitution “actually 
borrowed the separation of powers doctrine from the states” and, not 
surprisingly, “[f]ederal separation-of-powers doctrine often influences 
state jurisprudence.”91 
Retroactive criminal legislation—particularly, legislation that reduces 
final sentences—raises two important separation-of-powers questions.  
The first involves the relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary: Does the reduction of final sentences violate the separation of 
powers by interfering with the final judgments of courts?  The second 
involves the relationship between the legislature and the executive: 
Does retroactive repeal legislation violate the separation of powers by 
infringing the executive’s pardon power?92  Part III turns to the first 
question; Part IV takes up the second. 
III.  THE REDUCTION OF FINAL DEATH SENTENCES DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY INTERFERING 
WITH THE FINAL JUDGMENTS OF COURTS 
As discussed in Part I, the law is well settled that a legislature can 
enact laws that retroactively apply to pending cases so long as its intent 
is clear.93  In the criminal context, this means that a legislature can 
reduce punishment for anyone who has not exhausted his direct 
appeals—i.e., one who committed a crime before the effective date of 
the ameliorative statute, but who has not been arrested, tried, convicted, 
or sentenced, or whose sentence has not been affirmed by the highest 
court on direct appeal, until after the effective date of the statute.94 
 
90. RICH, supra note 74, at 389. 
91. Id.; Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights 
Claims: The Role of State Courts in Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1067 
(1993); see also Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 546 (2005) (stating that “the proposed federal 
Constitution’s formulation for separating the powers of government was modeled after many 
existing state constitutions”). 
92. As discussed more fully in Part III, this Article uses the word “pardon” generally to refer 
to the governor’s authority to pardon or commute sentences. 
93. See supra Part I and note 50 (discussing retroactive legislation and cases upholding 
retroactive legislation in pending cases); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
226 (1995) (“It is true . . . that Congress can always revise the judgments of Article III courts in 
one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that 
law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and 
must alter the outcome accordingly.”). 
94. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226; cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (“By 
‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of 
appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari 
finally denied.”); Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) (“Final judgment in a 
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But can a legislature go whole-hog, reducing punishment for those 
under a final sentence as well?  One might reasonably argue that, 
although the legislature has the power to repeal the death penalty 
retroactively in pending cases, the separation of powers between the 
judiciary and legislature prohibits the legislature from reducing final 
death sentences.  While this argument is a reasonable one and is 
supported by strong authority,95 the better argument, supported by 
stronger authority, is that the reduction of final death sentences raises no 
separation-of-powers problem.  As Professor Adrian Vermeule has 
written, courts’ rejection of such retroactive legislation on separation-
of-powers grounds can best be described as “paranoid . . . display[ing] a 
prickly sensitivity to any slighting of judicial prerogatives, a dismissive 
impatience toward legislative aims, and a general, brooding suspicion of 
legislative bad faith.”96  An analysis of the issue begins with the 
watershed case of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.97 
A.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.’s Prohibition on 
Re-Opening Final Judgments 
In 1996, in Plaut, the Supreme Court addressed the limits on 
Congress’ power to pass retroactive laws.98  The Court held that 
Congress cannot make retroactive laws that require courts to reopen 
final judgments; the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits it.99  
Although Plaut is not binding on states, it is strong persuasive authority 
for courts interpreting state constitutions.100  It is therefore instructive to 
examine this case in some detail. 
In 1987, plaintiff shareholders in Plaut brought suit against the 
defendant company, alleging fraud and deceit in the sale of stock under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.101  On June 20, 1991, with 
 
criminal case means sentence.  The sentence is the judgment.”). 
95. See infra Part III (discussing cases prohibiting reduction of final sentences). 
96. Vermeule, supra note 82, at 360; see Krent, supra note 36, at 57 (arguing that “there are 
no sound policy reasons or constitutional grounds to presume that congressional leniency should 
apply prospectively only.  Congress should be accorded the discretion to determine where to draw 
the line in determining the proper amount of retribution for those who committed offenses prior 
to the decriminalization or diminution in punishment.”); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 39 (“Whereas 
a retroactive increase in punishment is constitutionally barred, a decrease is not.  Denying the 
retroactive application of an ameliorative legislative change . . . ignores the fundamentally 
important concept that the standards of justice should and do evolve.”). 
97. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
98. Id. at 218–19. 
99. Id. 
100. See RICH, supra note 74, at 389; Feldman, supra note 91, at 1067. 
101. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213. 
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lengthy pretrial proceedings in Plaut still underway, the Supreme Court 
decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.102  
Lampf replaced various state statutes of limitations governing 
shareholder actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 with a uniform 
federal limitations rule,103 and in so doing, rendered the Plaut plaintiff 
shareholders’ action untimely under the new Lampf rule.104  The district 
court, applying Lampf, dismissed the shareholders’ claims with 
prejudice on August 13, 1991, and the judgment became final thirty 
days later.105 
Finding flaw with the Court’s failure to exempt pending cases from 
operation of the new uniform federal limitations rule, Congress enacted 
§ 27A of the Securities Exchange Act on December 19, 1991.106  
Section 27A(b) of the law required the “reinstate[ment] on motion by 
the plaintiff” of all shareholder actions that were pending at the time 
Lampf was decided and were subsequently dismissed as untimely under 
Lampf.107  Pursuant to § 27A(b), the shareholders filed a timely motion 
for reinstatement in the district court.108  The district court denied the 
motion on the ground that § 27A(b) was unconstitutional, and the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed.109 
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that § 27A(b) 
 
102. Id. 
103. Under the Court’s uniform federal limitations rule, “[l]itigation instituted pursuant to § 
10(b) and Rule 10b–5 . . . must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.”  Id. (quoting Lampf, Pleva, 
Limpkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
104. On the day it decided Plaut, the Court also decided James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991): 
[I]n which a majority of the Court held, albeit in different opinions, that a new rule of 
federal law that is applied to the parties in the case announcing the rule must be applied 
as well to all cases pending on direct review.  The joint effect of Lampf and Beam was 
to mandate application of the [uniform federal] . . . limitations period to petitioners’ 
suit [in Plaut]. 
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 214–15.  Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides: 
Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced 
on or before June 19, 1991—(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to 
June 19, 1991, and (2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period 
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, 
as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not 
later than 60 days after December 19, 1991. 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
108. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 215. 
109. Id. 
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violated the separation of powers because it required courts to reopen 
final judgments.110  In restricting the temporal reach of retroactive 
legislation, the Court acknowledged that there is no constitutional 
impediment to the passage of retroactive laws impacting pending 
cases.111  “When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive,” the Court 
stated, “an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments 
still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must 
alter the outcome accordingly.”112  By extension, a trial court must 
likewise apply a retroactive law in deciding a case that involves conduct 
predating the law.113 
But laws that retroactively command courts to reopen final judgments 
are different.  Article III of the Constitution, the Court explained, 
empowers the judiciary “not merely to rule on cases, but to decide 
them,” that is, to render a dispositive judgment that “conclusively 
resolves the case.”114  By enacting legislation that reopens final 
judgments, Congress exercises the “power to render final judgments”—
a power that belongs to the judiciary alone.115  “When retroactive 
legislation requires its own application in a case already finally 
adjudicated,” the Court stated: 
[I]t does no more and no less than “reverse a determination once 
made, in a particular case.”  . . .  Having achieved finality, . . . a 
judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with 
regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not 
declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very 
case was something other than what the courts said it was.116 
According to the Court, the laudable purposes of legislation 
reopening final judgments was beside the point: 
Not favoritism, nor even corruption, but power is the object of the 
separation-of-powers prohibition.  The prohibition is violated when an 
individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very 
best of reasons, such as the legislature’s genuine conviction 
(supported by all the law professors in the land) that the judgment was 
 
110. Id. at 240. 
111. Id. at 226. 
112. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 227 (“It is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy 
that rules on the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment, even when that has the effect 
of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at every level, must ‘decide 
according to existing laws.’” (internal citations omitted)) 
113. See id. at 226–27. 
114. Id. at 218–19. 
115. Id. at 231. 
116. Id. at 227–28. 
BARRY PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] Going Retro: Abolition For All 693 
wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are 
legislatively dissolved.117 
In support of its holding, the Court first looked to the Framers’ intent.  
According to the Court, a “sense of a sharp necessity to separate the 
legislative from the judicial power . . . triumphed among the Framers,” 
who “lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and 
judicial powers.”118  Long before and well after the Revolution, the 
Court noted, legislatures functioned “as courts of equity of last resort” 
or nullified judicial decisions through the passage of legislation.119 
The Court next turned to federal and state court decisions in the years 
immediately following ratification of the Constitution, which confirmed 
that the separation-of-powers doctrine “forbade interference with the 
final judgments of courts.”120  Judicial decisions and commentary from 
the mid-nineteenth century, the Court noted, further clarified that the 
line between permissible retroactive lawmaking and the unconstitutional 
usurpation of judicial authority is finality.121  Lastly, the Court 
emphasized the complete absence of precedent for retroactive 
legislation mandating the reopening of final judgments.  “That 
prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not 
understood to be constitutionally proscribed.”122 
B.  Limiting Plaut 
Plaut’s holding is well settled: Congress violates the separation of 
powers when it passes legislation reopening final judgments.123  At first 
 
117. Id. at 228. 
118. Id. at 219–21. 
119. Id. at 219–20. 
120. Id. at 224 (“The power to annul a final judgment . . . was ‘an assumption of Judicial 
power’ and therefore forbidden.” (quoting Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chipman 77 (Vt. 1824))). 
121. Id. at 224–25; see id. at 226 (“[J]udgments of Article III courts are ‘final and conclusive 
upon the rights of the parties.’” (quoting Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. App’x. 697, 700–704 
(1864) (opinion of Taney, C.J.))); see also id. at 225 (“If the legislature cannot thus indirectly 
control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its 
own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside their judgments, compelling 
them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps 
shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.” (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 94–95 (1868))). 
122. Id. at 230. 
123. Id. at 219.  One might argue that, for purposes of retroactivity in the criminal context, 
and especially in the death penalty context, “final judgment” should not mean the same thing that 
it means in the habeas context—i.e., the imposition of a sentence and the exhaustion of direct 
appeals.  Instead, the argument goes, “final judgment” should refer to the completion of the 
sentence—i.e., time served or, in the death penalty context, execution of the prisoner.  After all, 
one might argue, in the criminal context, 
[T]he broad scope of available collateral remedies raises the question of whether, as a 
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blush, Plaut appears to foreclose legislation that reduces final death 
sentences.  But a closer look at Plaut reveals three important limiting 
principles that provide support for such legislation.  A discussion of 
these three limiting principles follows. 
1.  Principle One: Plaut Does not Prohibit the Legislature from 
Reopening Final Judgments in Criminal Cases 
The first limiting principle drawn from Plaut narrows the Supreme 
Court’s holding to its facts: a legislature may pass legislation reopening 
final judgments in criminal—but not civil—cases.124  Authority for this 
limiting principle comes from Plaut itself, which was silent as to the 
reduction of final sentences, as well as from federal case law after Plaut 
that supports the reduction of final sentences. 
a.  Plaut’s Silence Regarding the Reduction of Final Sentences 
Plaut was a civil case holding that Congress violated the separation 
of powers in passing a law that “retroactively command[ed] the federal 
courts to reopen final judgments” for money damages.125  There was 
 
practical matter, a conviction [or sentence] is ever “certain” prior to completion of 
sentence or complete exhaustion of collateral remedies.  Additionally, there is so much 
uncertainty due to the possibility of retroactive application of constitutional decisions 
and the availability of relief on that basis, that adding the possibility of retroactive 
application of legislative changes does not significantly increase the amount of 
uncertainty. 
Comment, supra note 36, at 145–46 (footnotes omitted).  Construing “final judgment” in this way 
would permit the legislature to reduce any sentence, including a death sentence, at any time.  
While this argument is attractive, it is contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
imposition of a sentence “is the judgment” for purposes of retroactivity in the criminal context.  
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) (emphasis added); accord. Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6 (1987).  It also misunderstands the finality concern articulated 
by the Court in Plaut.  According to Plaut, retroactive changes to final judgments violate the 
separation of powers not because they undermine certainty but rather because they undermine the 
judiciary’s “duty . . . to say what the law is.”  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218–19.  Finality in this context 
is therefore not a concern with certainty but rather a concern with power; the imposition of a 
sentence and the exhaustion of direct appeals marks the line that separates the judicial and 
legislative powers.  As discussed below, this Article argues that the separation of powers 
nevertheless permits the legislature to reopen these concededly “final judgments.”  For other 
thoughtful arguments regarding why the legislative reduction of final sentences does not 
undermine final judgments, see Krent, supra note 36, at 74 (arguing that reduction of final 
sentences “does not disturb the finality of a judgment but rather modifies the prior ruling’s 
continuing impact”); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 39 (arguing that reduction of final sentences does 
not undermine final judgments because it “does not disturb finalized convictions”). 
124. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 798 (Pa. 1977) (Manderino, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that reopening of final criminal judgments does not violate the separation of powers and 
distinguishing cases prohibiting reopening of final civil judgments). 
125. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219; see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (“[T]he situation 
before the Court in [Plaut involved] legislation that attempted to reopen the dismissal of a suit 
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simply no discussion of the reopening of final judgments in the criminal 
context.  This distinction between the civil and criminal contexts is 
significant.  For example, one of the reasons relied upon by the Court to 
prohibit the reopening of final judgments was the intent of the Framers, 
who felt a “sharp sense of necessity” to separate powers.126  But the 
Framers did not make this separation absolute; in the criminal context, 
the federal constitution, like its state counterparts, permits the executive 
to pardon offenses.127  As the Court stated in Plaut, a final judicial 
decision in the civil context “conclusively resolves the case because a 
judicial Power is one to render dispositive judgments.”128  In the 
criminal context, however, a final judicial decision is not conclusive 
because it remains subject to the pardon power.129  Plaut never 
discussed the pardon power, nor why the Framers would permit the 
executive to reduce final sentences but not the legislature. 
Similarly, Plaut did not address how a blanket prohibition on the 
reopening of final judgments in the criminal context would render the 
Ex Post Facto Clause largely superfluous.  According to the Supreme 
Court, “two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law 
to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to 
events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the 
offender affected by it.”130  By contrast, Plaut’s separation-of-powers 
prohibition requires only the first element.131  Therefore, if Plaut’s 
holding were extended to the criminal context, the separation of powers 
would largely subsume the Ex Post Facto Clause; it would prohibit a 
legislature from enacting any retroactive legislation—whether 
ameliorative or more onerous—that reopened final judgments.132 
By this logic, the Ex Post Facto Clause would have no application 
except in cases that had not resulted in final judgment.  Importantly, the 
Supreme Court has not construed the Ex Post Facto Clause so narrowly.  
 
seeking money damages . . . .”); In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 
31, 80 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Absent further guidance . . .  it is not up to this Court to expand upon the 
basic holding in Plaut—that a statute is unconstitutional as a violation of the separations of power 
to the extent that it requires the reopening of a final judgment for money damages.”). 
126. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221. 
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
128. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219 (internal quotations omitted). 
129. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; State v. Morris, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715 (Ohio 1978) 
(“[E]xercise of the pardoning power has never been held to constitute an infringement of the 
judicial power.”); Sutley, 378 A.2d at 798 (Manderino, J., dissenting) (“A ‘final judgment’ in a 
criminal case . . . has never been held to be free from the power of pardon.”). 
130. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). 
131. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219. 
132. See id. 
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In Weaver v. Graham, the Court invalidated under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause a statute that reduced good time credit for a defendant whose 
sentence was final.133  The Court never mentioned the statute’s 
reopening of final judgments, much less that such reopening violated 
the separation of powers.134  Indeed, the Court’s only mention of the 
separation of powers appeared in a footnote, in which the Court stated 
that “[t]he ex post facto prohibition . . . upholds the separation of 
powers by confining the legislature to penal decisions with prospective 
effect and the judiciary and executive to applications of existing penal 
law.”135  Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion went further, explicitly 
acknowledging the Florida legislature’s power to enact retroactive 
criminal legislation benefitting those under a final sentence.136  The 
question of whether to “provide prisoners in petitioner’s position with 
the benefits” of a new law was not one of separation of powers, but one 
of statutory intent, and was therefore, “of course, one for Florida to 
resolve.”137 
Weaver’s majority and concurring opinions suggest that separation-
of-powers concerns over retroactive criminal legislation begin and end 
with the Ex Post Facto Clause.138  In other words, if retroactive criminal 
legislation is not ex post facto, it does not violate the separation of 
powers.139  Because Plaut was not a criminal case, the Court never 
addressed this interaction between the Ex Post Facto Clause and broader 
separation-of-powers concerns.140 
Two other reasons cited by the Plaut Court in support of its holding 
were the reluctance of federal and state courts to uphold legislation 
reopening final judgments in the civil context, and the reluctance of 
 
133. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 25–27, 36. 
134. See id. 
135. Id. at 29 n.10. 
136. Id. at 38–39 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
137. Id. at 39. 
138. See id. at 33–39. 
139. See id. at 29 n.10, 36. 
140. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 213 (1995); cf. Commonwealth v. 
Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 794 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Where . . . none of the specific 
prohibitions of the Pennsylvania Constitution have been violated, the Legislature has the power to 
enact legislation which mitigates the consequences of a final judgment.” (emphasis added)); 
Vermeule, supra note 82, at 361, 398 (proposing that state judges declare nonjusticiable “any 
claim that legislation intrudes upon the freestanding grant of the ‘judicial power’ vested in state 
courts under a separation-of-powers scheme,” while retaining power to “adjudicate claims that 
legislation either violates specific constitutional provisions governing judicial authority, such as a 
clause protecting judicial salaries from reduction, or violates independent constitutional rules, 
such as the right of jury trial.” (emphasis added)). 
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Congress to pass such legislation.141  In the criminal context, especially 
at the state level, these arguments are far less persuasive.  Simply put, 
legislatures have passed, and courts have upheld, legislation reducing 
final sentences.142 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases provide no further clarity regarding 
Plaut’s applicability in the criminal context.  In Loving v. United States, 
a federal death row inmate challenged Congress’ delegation of authority 
to the President to prescribe aggravating factors permitting imposition 
of the death penalty.143  Although the Court cited Plaut for the general 
proposition “that one branch of the Government may not intrude upon 
the central prerogatives of another,”144 the similarities between Plaut 
and Loving end there.  The issue in Loving was not whether Congress 
could reopen a final judgment, but rather whether Congress could 
confer power upon the President to establish factors narrowing the class 
of death-eligible defendants.145  The Court concluded that Congress’ 
delegation of such power to the President “was in all respects 
consistent” with the separation of powers.146 
More recently, in Miller v. French, the Court applied Plaut in the 
context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which provided 
for, among other things, the termination of ongoing injunctive relief in 
civil actions challenging prison conditions.147  Citing Plaut, the Court 
held that ongoing injunctive relief was not a final judgment and so a law 
terminating such relief did not violate the separation of powers.148  
Although Miller directly addressed whether Congress could reopen a 
final judgment, it did so in the civil context (i.e., legislation terminating 
civil relief), not the criminal context (i.e., legislation modifying a final 
conviction or sentence).149  Miller therefore reinforced Plaut’s holding, 
but did not extend it to the criminal context. 
 
141. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 223, 230. 
142. See supra notes 41 and accompanying text (discussing legislation reducing final 
sentences), 43 (discussing federal Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014); see also infra Part III.C 
(discussing state cases upholding legislation that reduced final sentences). 
143. 517 U.S. 748, 751–52 (1996). 
144. Id. at 757 (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225–26) (“Congress may not revise judicial 
determinations by retroactive legislation reopening judgments”)). 
145. Id. at 759. 
146. Id. at 774; see id. at 769 (“There is nothing in the constitutional scheme or our traditions 
to prohibit Congress from delegating the prudent and proper implementation of the capital murder 
statute to the President acting as Commander in Chief.”). 
147. 530 U.S. 327, 330–34 (2000). 
148. Id. at 344–45, 350. 
149. See id. at 344–45. 
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b.  Chambers’ Implied Prohibition on the 
Reduction of Final Sentences 
Notwithstanding Plaut’s silence as to whether the Constitution 
prohibits the reopening of final judgments in criminal cases, the 
Supreme Court’s decision more than sixty years earlier in United States 
v. Chambers strongly implies that retroactive reduction of final criminal 
sentences is prohibited.150  Chambers therefore presents an obstacle to 
the reduction of final sentences. 
In 1934, the Court in Chambers explicitly declined to address 
whether a change in the law (in that case, the passage of the Twenty-
First Amendment, which decriminalized the transportation, importation, 
and possession of alcohol by repealing the Eighteenth Amendment) 
could be applied retroactively to final judgments.151  While giving 
retroactive effect to the Twenty-First Amendment in cases pending at 
the time of its ratification, the Court stated that it was “not dealing with 
a case where final judgment was rendered prior to that ratification.  
Such a case would present a distinct question which is not before us.”152  
In a per curium opinion issued one month later in Massey v. United 
States, the Court clarified that the Twenty-First Amendment’s 
application to pending cases included cases on direct appeal at the time 
of ratification.153  Again, the Court avoided squarely addressing the 
question of whether an ameliorative change in criminal law could be 
applied retroactively to undo a final judgment. 
Many lower federal courts subsequently addressed the question left 
open in Chambers.  All held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not 
apply retroactively to final judgments, and all cited in support the 
Court’s qualifying statement in Chambers.154  For example, according 
to the Third Circuit, 
[T]he Supreme Court expressly excluded from the scope of 
[Chambers] persons who were serving sentences upon final 
judgments. . . .  The law seems to be well settled that a repeal, after 
 
150. See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 226 (1934). 
151. Id. at 222–23, 226. 
152. Id. at 226. 
153. Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608, 610 (1934) (“[I]t appears from the record that no 
final judgment was rendered herein against the petitioner prior to the ratification of the Twenty-
First Amendment.  The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as entered in the cause of this 
petitioner, is accordingly reversed . . . .”). 
154. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text (considering application of Twenty-First 
Amendment to sentences that became final prior to ratification). 
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final judgment, will neither vacate the judgment nor arrest the 
execution of a sentence partly executed under that judgment.155 
The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held likewise.156  As the 
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois stated, 
Whatever doubt there may be as to what the [C]ourt intended in its 
opinion in the Chambers Case . . . is to my mind eliminated by the last 
few lines of the opinion. . . .  It was entirely unnecessary, of course, 
for the Supreme Court to make this statement [limiting its holding to 
pending cases] with reference to a question not before it, and different 
minds may differ as to the purpose the court had in mind in making 
such a plain and unequivocal statement.  To my mind, however, . . . it 
is a plain warning that the rule announced in its opinion is to have no 
application to cases where a final judgment was rendered prior to the 
adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment.157 
The Supreme Court’s qualifying statement in Chambers, together 
with lower federal courts’ uniform interpretation of that statement, 
strongly supports a constitutional prohibition on the retroactive 
 
155. United States ex rel. Nerbonne v. Hill, 70 F.2d 1006, 1006–07 (3d Cir. 1934) (per 
curiam); see United States v. Voorhees, 72 F.2d 826, 826 (3d Cir. 1934) (per curiam) (refusing to 
give retroactive effect to Twenty-First Amendment where “[f]inal judgment and sentence were 
entered prior to . . . ratification,” and noting that the Supreme Court’s holding in Chambers “did 
not apply if such was the fact”). 
156. See United States ex rel. Randall v. U.S. Marshal for E.D.N.Y., 143 F.2d 830, 831 (2d 
Cir. 1944) (per curiam) (“When the defendant was sentenced and the judgment against him was 
affirmed and no application for a writ of certiorari was made within the period allowed by 
statute[,] judicial action became final and the repeal of the prohibition amendment did not under 
the following authorities affect the rights of the parties.”); Odekirk v. Ryan, 85 F.2d 313, 314 (6th 
Cir. 1936) (“[W]hile it is settled that the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment had the effect of 
terminating pending prosecutions, including those on appeal, for violation of the National 
Prohibition Act . . . , it is also settled that where an offense was committed against that act and a 
sentence passed on the offender prior to its repeal, the sentence is valid and must be legally 
executed.”).  In Hosier v. Aderhold, the Fifth Circuit held: 
The Twenty-First Amendment . . . cannot in our opinion be made to apply retroactively 
to a case like this where the prosecution [has] been completed and a valid judgment 
entered before its adoption.  That judgment, valid when rendered, remains valid, 
without the necessity of being constantly renewed, until satisfied by execution. . . . The 
decisions on the subject, though there have not been many reported, without exception 
hold that the repeal of a criminal statute after final judgment does not arrest or interfere 
with execution of the sentence. 
71 F.2d 422, 422 (5th Cir. 1934) (internal citations omitted); accord. United States v. Ing, 8 F. 
Supp. 471, 471–72 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). 
157. United States ex rel. Behen v. Ruppel, 6 F. Supp. 346, 348 (S.D. Ill. 1934) (“[T]he 
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution thereby repealing the Eighteenth 
Amendment and laws enacted thereunder, has no effect upon a person serving a sentence in 
prison as a result of a final judgment entered prior to such adoption and such repeal.”); id. 
(distinguishing Chambers, in which the Supreme Court “was considering solely the question as to 
the effect which the repeal of a statute would have on pending prosecutions and not cases where 
the matter in controversy had been reduced to a final judgment”). 
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reduction of final sentences.158  In short, Chambers and its progeny 
support the extension of Plaut to the criminal context. 
One might argue, however, that Chambers should not be read so 
broadly.  While Chambers may prohibit the reversal of a final 
conviction for conduct no longer deemed criminal,159 the argument 
goes, it does not prohibit the reduction of final sentences.  This 
distinction is unconvincing.  Chambers, as uniformly interpreted by the 
lower courts, supports the proposition that Congress cannot enact 
criminal laws that retroactively modify “final judgments.”160  As the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal 
case means sentence.  The sentence is the judgment.”161  Therefore, 
once there is a final judgment—i.e., the person is sentenced and all 
appeals have been taken—Congress cannot retroactively reduce a 
sentence any more than it can retroactively reverse a conviction for 
conduct no longer deemed criminal.  Both actions undo a final judgment 
and therefore, as Chambers appears to say, are prohibited.162 
Additionally, the fact that Chambers involved a repeal by 
constitutional amendment, not by statute, does not diminish Chambers’ 
authority for the proposition that Congress cannot enact laws that 
retroactively modify final judgments in the criminal context.163  In fact, 
this distinction would seem to support—not undermine—a prohibition 
on such laws.  After all, if the Supreme Court was unwilling to undo a 
final judgment as the result of an amendment to the Constitution—the 
supreme law of the land—it seems even less likely that it would be 
willing to undo a final judgment as the result of a new statute.164 
c.  Dorsey’s Support for the Reduction of Final Sentences 
Although Chambers and its interpretation by lower courts point 
toward a constitutional bar on the retroactive reduction of final 
sentences, the Court’s recent decision in Dorsey suggests otherwise.165  
In 2012, in Dorsey v. United States, the Court addressed whether the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which, among other things, reduced the 
 
158. See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 226 (1934); see also supra notes 150–57 
(discussing cases interpreting Chambers). 
159. See Chambers, 291 U.S. at 226 (affirming dismissal of indictment). 
160. Id. 
161. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 610 (1973) (quoting Berman v. United States, 
302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)). 
162. See Chambers, 291 U.S. at 226. 
163. Id. at 222. 
164. See id. at 226. 
165. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012). 
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penalty for crack-cocaine trafficking offenses, applied retroactively to 
those who committed their crimes before the Act’s effective date but 
were not sentenced until after that date.166  The Court began by 
acknowledging the presumption of non-retroactivity created by the 
federal general savings statute, and explained that this presumption 
could be overcome either “expressly or by implication.”167  Although 
the Court found no express congressional intent to apply the Fair 
Sentencing Act’s reduced penalties retroactively, the Court concluded 
that retroactive application was implied based on various “indicia of 
congressional intent.”168  Significantly, the Court’s holding extended 
only to those who, like the plaintiffs in Dorsey, were sentenced after the 
Act’s passage.169  It did not extend to the tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of crack offenders whose sentences became final before the 
effective date of the Act, or those whose sentences were pending on 
appeal at the time of the Act’s passage.170 
At first glance, Dorsey appears to provide strong support for Plaut’s 
application in the criminal context.  After all, not only did the Dorsey 
Court refuse to undo the final sentences of crack offenders, but it also 
refused to undo the sentences of crack offenders whose sentences had 
not yet become final and were pending on appeal at the time of passage 
of the Fair Sentencing Act.171  Even Plaut did not go that far, holding 
that Congress can retroactively modify judgments in cases “still on 
appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted.”172 
But a careful reading of Dorsey points to a different conclusion—that 
Congress may retroactively undo final sentences in certain 
circumstances, so long as it is clear that it is doing so.173  Although 
neither the Fair Sentencing Act’s plain language nor other indicia of 
congressional intent revealed an intent by Congress to re-open final 
sentences, the Court implicitly acknowledged that Congress had the 
 
166. Id. at 2326. 
167. Id. at 2331; see supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing federal general savings 
statute). 
168. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2331 (“Six considerations, taken together, convince us that 
Congress intended the Fair Sentencing Act’s more lenient penalties to apply to those offenders 
whose crimes preceded August 3, 2010, but who are sentenced after that date.”). 
169. Id. at 2326. 
170. Id.; see Krent, supra note 36, at 54. 
171. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2326 (“The question here is whether the Act’s more lenient 
penalty provisions apply to offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 
2010, but were not sentenced until after August 3.” (emphasis added)). 
172. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995). 
173. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335. 
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power to do so.174  In its discussion of the disparities created by treating 
those sentenced before enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act differently 
from those sentenced after the Act, the Court stated that “those 
disparities will exist whenever Congress enacts a new law changing 
sentences (unless Congress intends re-opening sentencing proceedings 
concluded prior to a new law’s effective date).”175  This sentence may 
stand for the unremarkable proposition that Congress has the power to 
undo sentences pending on direct review, but the Court’s use of the 
terms “re-open[]” and “concluded” appears to indicate finality.176  To 
paraphrase Justice Scalia in Plaut, there is no need to “re-open” actions 
that are still pending on appeal.177  While it is “perhaps arguable” that 
this language “does not include suits that are not yet finally dismissed, 
i.e., suits still pending on appeal . . . there is no basis for the contention 
that it includes only those.”178  Significantly, in his dissenting opinion in 
Dorsey, Justice Scalia, joined by then-Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Alito, did not take issue with the majority’s 
reference to Congress’ ability to re-open final sentencing 
proceedings.179 
Additional language in Dorsey supports the proposition that the 
Court’s reluctance to extend the Fair Sentencing Act to those finally 
sentenced prior to the Act’s passage was driven by rules of statutory 
interpretation, not constitutional concerns.  “[I]n federal sentencing,” 
the Court stated, “the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to 
defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from 
defendants already sentenced.”180  Importantly, the Court did not state 
that withholding new penalties from defendants already sentenced was 
constitutionally prohibited; the Court merely stated that such was not 
the “ordinary practice.”181  Stated another way, the Dorsey Court 
refused to extend the Fair Sentencing Act to those sentenced prior to the 
 
174. See id. 
175. Id. (emphasis added). 
176. Id. 
177. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217 (“There is no need to ‘reinstate’ actions that are still pending; [the 
new law] could and would be applied by the courts of appeals.”). 
178. Id. 
179. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2339–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
180. Id. at 2335; see id. at 2332 (“[T]he Sentencing Reform Act sets forth a special and 
different background principle [than the federal general savings statute].  Th[e Sentencing Reform 
Act] . . . says that when ‘determining the particular sentence to be imposed’ in an initial 
sentencing, the sentencing court ‘shall consider,’ among other things, the ‘sentencing range’ 
established by the Guidelines that are ‘in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.’” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
181. Id. at 2335. 
BARRY PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] Going Retro: Abolition For All 703 
Act’s passage not because the Constitution’s separation of powers 
prohibited it, but rather because Congress did not intend it.182 
Because Dorsey rested on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, the 
Court’s refusal to extend the Fair Sentencing Act to those finally 
sentenced does not mean that Congress lacks the power to reduce final 
sentences through passage of retroactive criminal statutes.183  Indeed, 
had the Court decided that Congress could not, under any 
circumstances, retroactively reduce final sentences without violating the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, the Court would have invoked this 
doctrine and relied on Plaut or Chambers in support.  Significantly, the 
Court did neither of these things.184 
Lower federal courts have universally held that the Fair Sentencing 
Act does not apply to those finally sentenced before the Act took 
effect.185  Like Dorsey, however, these lower court decisions were 
premised on rules of statutory construction, not on the separation-of-
powers-doctrine.186  None held that Congress lacked the power to undo 
final sentences; in fact, the opposite is true.  In United States v. Blewett, 
for example, the Sixth Circuit joined “[e]very other federal court of 
appeals” in holding that the Fair Sentencing Act “does not retroactively 
undo final sentences,” but strongly implied that Congress could have 
made the Act retroactive to offenders already sentenced if it had wanted 
to.187  According to the Sixth Circuit, a different result might have been 
achieved had Congress included in the Fair Sentencing Act language 
“provid[ing] that [the Act] covers offenders sentenced before it became 
effective” or otherwise “clear[ly] . . . show[ing] a desire to apply the 
new law to offenders already sentenced.”188  Given the Act’s 
inapplicability to final sentences, the Sixth Circuit encouraged Congress 
to “think seriously about making the new minimums retroactive,” and 
encouraged the plaintiff to address his request for a sentence reduction 
“to a different forum altogether (the Congress and the President).”189 
Blewett’s five dissenting opinions also assumed Congress’ authority 
 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
185. United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Every other federal court of 
appeals—except the Federal Circuit, which does not hear criminal cases—has [refused to apply 
Fair Sentencing Act to individuals sentenced before its effect date.]”). 
186. See, e.g., id. at 651 (“Congress . . . intended to follow the ‘ordinary practice [of] 
apply[ing] new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from 
defendants already sentenced.” (quoting Dorsey, 132 S Ct. at 2335)). 
187. See Blewett, 746 F.3d at 649, 659. 
188. Id. at 650. 
189. Id. at 660. 
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to apply the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively to final sentences.  
According to Judge White, 
[T]he scheme set up by Congress contemplates not only that finality is 
not sacrosanct, but that consideration whether a change should be 
available for application to offenders already under sentence should 
be a part of the very process of making changes, and the determination 
left to the Commission’s sound discretion.190 
d.  Summary of Federal Courts’ Treatment of the 
Reduction of Final Sentences 
Plaut did not address whether Congress has the power to reopen final 
judgments in the criminal context, and United States Supreme Court and 
lower federal court precedent is, at best, unclear on this point.191  
Although Chambers and its progeny suggest that Congress cannot 
reduce final sentences, Dorsey and its progeny suggest that Congress 
can, so long as it makes its intent clear.192  Because Dorsey—decided 
over forty years after Chambers and over fifteen years after Plaut—is 
the more recent statement of the Court, the better argument is that Plaut 
does not prohibit legislatures from reopening final judgments in the 
criminal context, including reducing final death sentences.193 
 
2.  Principle Two: The Separation of Powers Permits 
the Legislature to Reduce Final Sentences 
to Further Liberty 
Limiting Plaut to the civil context removes a precedential obstacle to 
the reduction of final sentences, but it does not provide an affirmative 
argument for why the reduction of final sentences is constitutional.194  
A court willing to acknowledge that Plaut does not control in the 
criminal context may still believe that, at least sometimes, the separation 
of powers prohibits legislatures from reopening final judgments in 
criminal cases.195  Therefore, a second limiting principle, derived from 
 
190. Id. at 692 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see id. at 688 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
(“It may be that the Supreme Court Justices and litigants in Dorsey assumed that the 18–1 
minimums could not be applied whenever sentencing occurred prior to the Fair Sentencing Act’s 
passage.  But assumptions are not law.”). 
191. See supra Part III.B.1.a–c (discussing Plaut, Chambers, and Dorsey). 
192. See supra Part III.B.1.b–c (discussing Chambers and Dorsey). 
193. See id. 
194. See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that Plaut’s holding should be limited to civil context). 
195. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240–41 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he separation of powers inherent in our Constitution means that at least sometimes Congress 
lacks the power under Article I to reopen an otherwise closed court judgment.”). 
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Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Plaut, is instructive: the separation of 
powers permits the legislature to pass laws reopening final judgments in 
criminal cases so long as such laws contain liberty-protecting 
assurances.196  Although Justice Breyer found no such liberty-protecting 
assurances in the retroactive law at issue in Plaut, his analysis points to 
the opposite conclusion with respect to legislation that reduces final 
sentences, and therefore offers state courts another means of 
distinguishing Plaut. 
The Plaut majority’s central premise—that Congress has no authority 
to reopen final judgments—was sharply contested.197  In his dissenting 
opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens argued that 
Congress has always had the power to reopen final judgments.198  
“Throughout our history, Congress has passed laws that allow courts to 
reopen final judgments,” and “the Court has never invalidated such a 
law on separation of powers grounds until today.”199 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence traced a more moderate path.  Resisting 
the majority’s “absolute, always determinative” rule declaring 
unconstitutional all legislation that requires the reopening of final 
judgments, Justice Breyer stated that “important separation-of-powers 
decisions of this Court have sometimes turned, not upon absolute 
distinctions, but upon degree.”200  According to Justice Breyer, it was 
not clear that “the separation of powers is violated whenever an 
individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded.”201  Although 
“sometimes Congress lacks the power under Article I to reopen an 
otherwise closed court judgment,” this determination comes only after 
an examination of whether the law threatens individual liberty.202 
For example, according to Justice Breyer, a retroactive law that 
reopens final judgments, applies only retroactively, and applies only to 
a limited number of individuals violates the separation of powers.203  It 
risks “singling out” individuals for “oppressive treatment” in violation 
of the separation of powers’ “liberty-protecting objectives.”204  By 
 
196. See id. at 243–44. 
197. See id. at 219 (majority opinion). 
198. Id. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. at 247–48 (emphasis added). 
200. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
201. Id. at 241. 
202. Id. at 240–41; see id. at 242 (“[T]he Constitution’s ‘separation-of-powers’ principles 
reflect, in part, the Framers’ ‘concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a 
substantial deprivation on one person.” (citation omitted)). 
203. See id. at 243. 
204. Id. at 243–44. 
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contrast, a retroactive law that reopens final judgments while “providing 
some of the [liberty-protecting] assurances against ‘singling out’ that 
ordinary legislative activity normally provides—say, prospectivity and 
general applicability”—might pass constitutional muster.205  Its 
evenhanded application and lack of a “substantial deprivation on one 
person” may support the reopening of final judgments.206 
Rejecting Justice Breyer’s balancing test (and the dissent’s broad 
support for retroactive reopening provisions) in favor of a formalistic, 
bright-line rule, the majority stated that: 
[T]he doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather 
than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of 
specific harm, can be identified.  In its major features (of which the 
conclusiveness of judicial judgments is assuredly one), it is a 
prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions 
because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially 
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.207 
Plaut’s majority and concurring opinions pit formalism against 
functionalism.  For the majority, Congress violates the separation of 
powers when it reopens final judgments—full stop.208  For Justice 
Breyer, however, Congress violates the separation of powers when it 
reopens final judgments without providing some “liberty-protecting” 
assurances—such as prospectivity and general applicability—against 
the “singling out” of individuals for adverse treatment.209  If the 
reopening of final judgments can be accomplished while protecting 
individual liberty, then, according to Justice Breyer, there is no 
separation-of-powers problem.210 
Justice Breyer’s focus on individual liberty, “a basic separation-of-
powers principle,” lends support to the reopening of final judgments in 
the criminal context.211  Individual liberty, one might reasonably argue, 
is not furthered by depriving criminal defendants of the benefits of a 
 
205. Id. at 243. 
206. See id. at 241–42 (discussing Framers’ intent that “even an unfair law at least will be 
applied evenhandedly according to its terms” and their “concern that a legislature should not be 
able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person”). 
207. Compare id. at 239, with id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e need not, and we 
should not . . . make of the reopening itself, an absolute, always determinative distinction, a 
‘prophylactic device,’ or a foundation for the building of a new ‘high wal[l]’ between the 
branches.”). 
208. See id. at 239–40. 
209. Id. at 243–44 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
210. See id. at 243–44 (“[I]f Congress enacted legislation that reopened an otherwise closed 
judgment but in a way that mitigated some of the here relevant ‘separation-of-powers’ 
concerns . . . we might have a different case.”). 
211. Id. at 241. 
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subsequent ameliorative law.212  In fact, retroactive application of such 
a law furthers individual liberties by preventing what one commentator 
has referred to as a “stark instance of governmental arbitrariness”: the 
imposition of a punishment that the people have rejected.213  This is 
especially true in the death penalty context, where not just liberty but 
life is at stake. 
Justice Breyer was particularly concerned with the “singling out of a 
few individuals for adverse treatment” through retroactive legislation—
for example, the singling out of defendant businesses in Plaut, who 
relied on the finality of favorable judgments.214  Unlike in the civil 
context, no party is disadvantaged or “oppressed” by the reopening of 
final judgments in the criminal context.215  The criminal defendant 
receives an obvious benefit (a reduced sentence), and there is no 
disadvantage to the State, whose legislature passed the retroactive law 
reopening final judgments in the first place.216 
The case of United States v. Sioux Nation is instructive.217  In that 
case, the Court gave retroactive effect to a law that permitted the 
reopening of final judgments in cases brought by the Sioux Nation 
 
212. See id. at 241. 
213. Final Judgments, supra note 80, at 239; see Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 
(1996) (discussing “deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule” as one reason for separation of 
powers). 
214. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. 243–44 (noting that singling out of 
defendants for adverse treatment was more relevant to separation of powers inquiry than singling 
out of plaintiffs for favorable treatment). 
215. See id. at 243–44 (expressing concern over targeting of particular defendants for adverse 
treatment); see also Krent, supra note 36, at 64 (“The concern for retroactivity in [the context of 
ameliorative legislation] is not that the Legislature is singling out individuals for disadvantageous 
treatment but rather to confer a benefit.”).  One might argue that the reduction of final sentences 
does disadvantage certain individuals, namely, victims.  While it is true that the legislature’s 
reduction of final sentences may disturb victims’ expectations of punishment for the convicted 
prisoner, these expectations are far more attenuated than the liberty interests that concerned 
Justice Breyer.  Indeed, the State is not obligated to honor victims’ expectations when prosecuting 
a case, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); the executive is not 
prevented from upsetting these expectations in pardoning a crime or commuting a sentence; and 
the judiciary remains free to disturb these expectations on collateral review.  Therefore, while the 
legislature’s dashing of victims’ expectations may strike some as unfair, it does not threaten 
liberty. 
216. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715 (Ohio 1978) (“It does not hinder the state 
from divesting itself of any right of claim of its own.  The only party who could object is the 
prisoner, and he can not, where it is clearly for his benefit.”); Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 
795, 795 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Because only public rights are involved, and the 
Legislature has decided that the harsh penalties formerly applicable no longer serve the public 
interest, the Legislature’s decision to provide for resentencing should be respected.”). 
217. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
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seeking just compensation from the federal government.218  There, the 
party disadvantaged by the reopening of final judgments—the federal 
government—was the very body that passed the retroactive law 
reopening final judgments.219  Acknowledging that “Congress may 
recognize its obligation to pay a moral debt” by waiving legal defenses, 
the Court held that the retroactive law did not violate the separation of 
powers because “Congress has the power to waive the res judicata effect 
of a prior judgment entered in the Government’s favor on a claim 
against the United States.”220  Applying Justice Breyer’s balancing 
scheme to Sioux Nation, there simply was no disadvantage to the U.S. 
government in allowing the reopening of final judgments because 
Congress waived its reliance on finality through passage of the 
retroactive law.221  As in Sioux Nation, the reduction of final death 
sentences does not disadvantage the State, whose legislature has waived 
reliance on finality by passing the law reducing such sentences.222 
Furthermore, ameliorative criminal legislation contains the liberty-
protecting assurances outlined by Justice Breyer—namely prospectivity 
and generality.223  Death penalty-repeal legislation like California’s, for 
example, does not seek only the elimination of the death penalty for 
those on death row—it seeks abolition of the death penalty in toto.224  
And such legislation does not apply to a small number of individuals, 
but rather applies generally to all those who have committed or will 
commit otherwise death-eligible crimes.225 
Justice Breyer’s elevation of functionalism over formalism thus 
 
218. Id. at 407. 
219. Id. at 390–91. 
220. Id. at 397. 
221. See id. 
222. See id.; see also Vermeule, supra note 82, at 382 (“[C]riminal sentences are, of all 
judicial judgments, the most susceptible to revision by the political branches, so long as the 
revision operates in the prisoner’s favor.  As the winning party to the previous judgment, the state 
should be able to waive the benefit of its judgment the way other parties may.”); cf. Ann 
Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1058 
(2006) (proposing “lenient scrutiny for retroactive legislation affecting traditional public rights,” 
such as criminal penalties, but “strict scrutiny for retroactive legislation imposing on private 
rights” (emphasis added)). 
223. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 243–44 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
Commentators have suggested still other factors that might be included in the balance.  See, e.g., 
Final Judgments, supra note 80, at 238 (avoidance of arbitrariness and partiality). 
224. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing the SAFE California Act). 
225. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 795 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he separation of powers principle is in no way offended when the Legislature 
provides, pursuant to a statute of general application, that persons convicted under prior laws 
should be resentenced by the courts in accordance with the lesser penalties provided for by the 
statute currently in force.” (emphasis added)). 
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supports the reduction of final sentences, especially death sentences.226  
Because laws reducing death sentences further the liberty (and life) 
interests of prisoners, do not disadvantage others, and contain other 
liberty-protecting assurances, one may reasonably argue that they do not 
violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.227 
3.  Principle Three: The Separation of Powers Permits 
the Legislature to Reduce Final Sentences 
if Courts Retain Discretion 
Even if a court finds that Plaut’s holding applies to retroactive 
criminal legislation or that such legislation “singles out” individuals in 
violation of Justice Breyer’s balancing test, a third limiting principle 
drawn from Plaut strongly supports the reduction of final sentences.  
This limiting principle seizes on the importance of judicial discretion: 
the separation of powers permits the legislature to pass laws 
“authorizing” but not “mandating” the reopening of final judgments.228  
Significantly, Plaut involved “retroactive legislation requiring an 
Article III court to set aside a final judgment.”229  If the retroactive 
legislation had required a court to review the judgment but had given 
the court discretion to set it aside, Plaut might have gone the other 
way.230  Justice Stevens’ dissent in Plaut and the majority’s response 
make this clear.231 
 
226. See Plaut, at 244–45 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
227. See id.  This focus on individual liberty in the context of statutory retroactivity finds 
some support in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the retroactivity of judicial decisions.  
Although an in-depth discussion of decisional retroactivity is beyond the scope of this Article, 
some introductory thoughts are instructive.  See generally Barry, Part I, supra note 34, at 336 
n.97 (distinguishing statutory retroactivity from judicial (decisional) retroactivity).  In Teague v. 
Lane, a plurality of the Court held that, when a case announces a “watershed” rule that requires 
the observance of procedures “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” that rule should be 
applied retroactively to cases that have become final. 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality).  
Although the Supreme Court has applied this exception in very few cases, see, e.g., Brown v. 
Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328 (1980) (holding that decision announcing right to unanimous six-
person jury was retroactive to final cases), the Court’s consideration of “ordered liberty” in 
deciding whether to give retroactive effect to its decisions supports a functionalist approach to 
statutory retroactivity.  For example, one might argue that by retroactively reducing final 
sentences, the legislature is, in a sense, decreeing that the original sentencing law was inconsistent 
with the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, should be given retroactive effect by the courts.  
Cf. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (discussing second circumstance in which Supreme Court gives retroactive 
effect to its decisions, namely, when a decision announces a new rule that “prohibit[s] a certain 
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.”). 
228. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 233–34. 
229. Id. at 240 (emphasis added). 
230. See id. 
231. See infra notes 232–41 and accompanying text (discussing majority’s and Justice 
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Justice Stevens began with the familiar refrain that the Constitution 
does not “require[] that the three branches of Government ‘operate with 
absolute independence.’  Rather, our jurisprudence reflects ‘Madison’s 
flexible approach to separation of powers.’”232  Accordingly, statutory 
provisions “that to some degree commingle the functions of the 
Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or 
encroachment” do not violate the separation of powers.233  The statute 
at issue in Plaut, Justice Stevens argued, did “not decide the merits of 
any issue in any litigation”—a quintessentially judicial function.234  It 
“neither command[ed] the reinstatement of any particular case nor 
direct[ed] any result on the merits.”235  Instead, it merely “remove[d] an 
unanticipated and unjust impediment to adjudication of a large class of 
claims on their merits” by “enact[ing] a law that applied a substantive 
rule to a class of litigants, specif[ying] a procedure for invoking the 
rule, and le[aving] particular outcomes to individualized judicial 
determinations—a classic exercise of legislative power.”236 
In this way, Justice Stevens argued, the statute at issue in Plaut was 
like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes courts to 
retroactively relieve parties from a final judgment for excusable neglect, 
newly discovered evidence, fraud, and other reasons.237  Accordingly, 
Justice Stevens concluded, the statute at issue in Plaut, like Rule 60(b), 
posed “no danger of ‘aggrandizement or encroachment’” and therefore 
did not violate the separation of powers.238 
In response, the majority distinguished Rule 60(b) from the statute at 
issue in Plaut, noting that Rule 60(b) was not, in fact, mandatory.239  
Rule 60(b) “authorizes discretionary judicial revision of judgments in 
the listed situations and in other ‘extraordinary circumstances’”; it does 
not, like the statute in Plaut, “impose any legislative mandate to reopen 
upon the courts, but merely reflects and confirms the courts’ own 
inherent and discretionary power . . . to set aside a judgment whose 
 
Stevens’ differing opinions regarding resemblance of statute at issue in Plaut to Rule 60(b)). 
232. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 260 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. (emphasis added). 
235. Id. at 266. 
236. Id. at 264; see id. at 260–61 (“§ 27A(b) specifies both a substantive rule to govern the 
reopening of a class of judgments—the pre-Lampf limitations rule—and a procedure for the 
courts to apply in determining whether a particular motion to reopen should be granted.  These 
characteristics are quintessentially legislative.”). 
237. Id. at 256 (citations omitted). 
238. Id. at 264. 
239. Id. at 233. 
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enforcement would work inequity.”240  A retroactive legislative change, 
“subject to the control of the courts themselves,” the majority noted 
elsewhere in its opinion, “would obviously raise no issue of separation 
of powers.”241 
As the majority and dissent’s exchange makes clear, the Constitution 
permits a legislature to “authorize”—but not “mandate”—the reopening 
of final judgments.242  Although the line between the two is not always 
clear, Rule 60(b) and the statute at issue in Plaut serve as useful 
guideposts.  A law reducing final death sentences will most likely 
survive a separation-of-powers challenge if, like Rule 60(b), the law 
provides that a court “may” reopen the final judgment when it makes 
certain findings.243  The Smarter Sentencing Act, now pending in 
Congress, provides a useful example.244  That legislation would allow 
certain inmates finally sentenced before the effective date of the Fair 
Sentencing Act to petition for sentence reductions consistent with the 
Fair Sentencing Act, and would give courts the discretion to impose a 
reduced sentence.245 
 
240. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court, therefore, must 
mean to hold that Congress may not unconditionally require an Article III court to set aside a 
final judgment.”).  The Court also distinguished various other laws that provided for the 
reopening of final judgments, including laws that disturbed the final judgments of non-Article III 
courts and administrative agencies, or altered the prospective effect of an injunction entered by an 
Article III court.  Id. at 232. 
241. Id. at 231–32. 
242. See supra notes 232–41 and accompanying text (discussing majority’s and Justice 
Stevens’ differing opinions regarding resemblance of statute at issue in Plaut to Rule 60(b)).  The 
mandatory feature of retroactive legislation reducing final judgments also troubled the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  See Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782 (Pa. 1977) (“A 
plain reading of the enactment reveals that it is couched in mandatory language; it unquestionably 
directs that a defendant ‘shall be resentenced under this act upon his petition if the penalties 
hereunder are less than those under prior law . . .’  The amendment is, in operation and effect, a 
legislative command to the courts to open a judgment previously made final, and to substitute for 
that judgment a disposition of the matter in accordance with the subsequently expressed 
legislative will.  The vesting in the legislature of the power to alter final judgments would be 
repugnant to our concept of the separation of the three branches of government.” (emphasis 
added)); see also People v. Bunn, 37 P.3d 380, 394 n.14 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting retroactive 
application of statute requiring—as opposed to merely permitting—reopening of final judgment). 
243. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 233 (discussing Rule 60(b)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (stating 
that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding” for six reasons, including “any other reason that justifies 
relief” (emphasis added)). 
244. See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, supra note 43. 
245. Id. (“A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense, may, on motion of the 
defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, 
impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect 
at the time the covered offense was committed.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see Press 
Release, U.S. Senate,  Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act, (Aug. 1, 2013), 
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By contrast, a law reducing final death sentences may violate the 
separation of powers if, like the statute in Plaut, it provides that a court 
“shall” reopen a final judgment when certain purely administrative 
requirements are met.246  California’s Proposition 34 is a case in point.  
That proposition stated that the repeal “shall be applied retroactively,” 
and that any sentence of death entered prior to the effective date of the 
act “shall automatically be converted to imprisonment in the state 
prison for life without the possibility of parole under the terms and 
conditions of this act.”247  Plaut did not address the gap between these 
two poles, that is, whether the separation of powers permits a law that 
requires a court to reopen a final judgment when it makes certain 
substantive findings.248 
C.  State Courts’ Conflicting Treatment of the 
Reduction of Final Sentences 
Although many state courts have concluded that ameliorative 
criminal legislation does not apply retroactively to final judgments, they 
have done so with remarkably little reasoning and with no constitutional 
analysis whatsoever.249  Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California appear to 
 
available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=be68ad86-a0a4-
4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736 (discussing introduction of Smarter Sentencing Act “to modernize drug 
sentencing policies by giving federal judges more discretion in sentencing those convicted of 
non-violent offenses”). 
246. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15 (“Any private civil action . . . that was commenced on or 
before June 19, 1991—(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and 
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws 
applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 
19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 
1991.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
247. The SAFE California Act § 10(a)–(b), supra note 39.  The drafters of the SAFE 
California Act were keenly aware of the likelihood that the retroactive provision may violate the 
separation of powers; the act included a severability clause providing for the constitutionality of 
the rest of the act should the retroactivity provision fail.  Id. § 12.  Importantly, the fact that 
California’s death penalty repeal statute was proposed by voters through the ballot initiative 
process—not by legislators—does not impact the separation-of-power analysis.  See Legislature 
v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 26–27 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he power of the people through the statutory 
initiative is coextensive with the power of the Legislature. . . .  Although the initiative power must 
be construed liberally to promote the democratic process . . . when utilized to enact statutes, those 
statutes are subject to the same constitutional limitations and rules of construction as are other 
statutes.”). 
248. Justice Stevens suggested that the separation of powers would permit such legislation.  
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Congress surely could add to 
Rule 60(b) certain instances in which courts must grant relief from final judgments if they make 
particular findings—for example, a finding that a member of the jury accepted a bribe from the 
prevailing party”). 
249. Several state supreme courts have refused to apply ameliorative statutes retroactively to 
reduce final sentences.  E.g., Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Alaska 1974); Davis 
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be the only states to have squarely addressed whether the separation of 
powers permits a legislature to reopen final judgments in the criminal 
context.250  Pennsylvania courts prohibit the reduction of final 
sentences, Ohio courts allow it, and California courts are split. 
1.  Pennsylvania 
In 1977, in Commonwealth v. Sutley, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that a statute mandating the reduction of final 
sentences for those convicted of marijuana possession violated the 
separation of powers.251  Foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Plaut nearly two decades later, the majority opinion in Sutley was 
premised on a formalistic conception of the separation of powers—one 
that embraced a clear line of demarcation between the legislature and 
judiciary.252  “[E]ven though the legislature possesses the power to 
promulgate the substantive law,” the court reasoned, “judicial 
judgments and decrees entered pursuant to those laws may not be 
affected by subsequent legislative changes after those judgments and 
decrees have become final.”253  To hold otherwise, the court concluded, 
would undermine “the inviolability of final judgments of the judiciary” 
by permitting the legislature to substitute its will for the final judgments 
of the courts.254  It would also “distort the exercise of judicial 
discretion” by further reducing the sentences of prisoners who may have 
received the benefit of judicial discretion at their original sentencing.255 
 
v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1317, 1322 (Ind. 1983); Duff v. Clarke, 526 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Neb. 1995); 
People v. Utsey, 855 N.E.2d 791, 794 (N.Y. 2006); Pollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400, 402 (Okla. 
Crim. Ct. 1974); accord. Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002600-MR, 2009 WL 
2568899, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009).  Still more state supreme courts have applied 
ameliorative statutes retroactively to reduce sentences in pending cases, while reasoning that such 
statutes would not apply to final sentences.  E.g., People v. Thomas, 525 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Colo. 
1974); State v. Von Geldern, 638 P.2d 319, 323–24 (Haw. 1981); State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d 
734, 737 (Iowa 1972); State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514–15 (Minn. 1979); State v. Wilson, 
926 P.2d 712, 716 (Mont. 1996); State v. Pardon, 157 S.E.2d 698, 702 (N.C. 1967); State v. 
Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 472 n.2 (N.D. 1986); State v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 947 (R.I. 
1977); Belt v. Turner, 483 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1971); State v. Zornes, 475 P.2d 109, 112 (Wash. 
1970), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); cf. Gibbons 
v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 85 (N.J. 1981) (holding that statute amending divorce law applied 
retroactively to cases “presently on direct appeal or in which a final judgment has not been 
entered”). 
250. See infra notes Part III.C.1–3 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting treatment of 
reduction of final sentences in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California). 
251. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782 (Pa. 1977). 
252. See id. 
253. Id. at 784. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 787. 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Pomeroy underscored the importance 
of the majority’s categorical approach: 
The concept of the finality of judgments and the integrity of the 
judicial process would, I fear, be seriously jeopardized were the 
understandable effort of the legislature in this situation to be validated.  
Courts may sentence only for acts made criminal by the legislature 
and may do so only within limits set by the legislature.  When, 
however, those steps are taken, they are judicial acts, and in my view 
may not be undone by the legislature because it has come to believe 
that its prior treatment of the offense was mistaken.256 
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Roberts rejected the majority’s 
formalistic conception of the separation of powers, opting instead for a 
more flexible approach akin to Justice Breyer’s balancing test.257  
According to Justice Roberts, when the reduction of final sentences is 
considered in light of the principles underlying the separation of 
powers—namely the defense against tyranny and protection of the 
rights of the individual—there is no separation-of-powers problem, for 
two primary reasons.258 
First, statutes of general application that reduce final sentences do not 
infringe on the province of the judiciary; they do not, for example, 
empower the legislature to make or review findings in particular cases 
or to decide that a trial court’s choice of sentence in a particular case 
was an abuse of discretion.259  Instead, these statutes merely affirm the 
legislature’s power to define criminal offenses and determine the range 
of punishments, which necessarily includes “[t]he power to determine 
what classes of offenders should benefit by the reduced penalties. . . .  
Simply because final judgments may be affected,” Justice Roberts 
argued, “does not mean that the Legislature has infringed on the 
province of the judiciary.”260 
Second, statutes reducing final sentences do not burden the private 
rights of individuals.261  On the contrary, such statutes benefit the 
private rights of individuals—namely, defendants—by reducing their 
punishment.262  The public, of course, has an interest in the enforcement 
 
256. Id. at 789 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). 
257. Id. at 791 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 792 (stating that such statutes “leave[] to the judiciary the power to impose 
sentences on the individuals to whom [the statutes] appl[y]. . . .  Rather than impairing or 
usurping the power of the judiciary, enactment of [such] legislation . . . is peculiarly within the 
province of the Legislature”). 
260. Id. at 796. 
261. See id. at 794–95. 
262. Id. 
BARRY PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] Going Retro: Abolition For All 715 
of sentences “to vindicate the public’s interest in obedience to the law, 
and to protect the public against future violations,” but this interest finds 
expression through the will of the legislature.263  As Justice Roberts 
stated, “[b]ecause only public rights are involved, and the Legislature 
has decided that the harsh penalties formerly applicable no longer serve 
the public interest, the Legislature’s decision to provide for resentencing 
should be respected.”264 
2.  Ohio 
Less than one year later, in State v. Morris, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio considered the constitutionality of legislation that required the 
reduction of final sentences for those convicted of certain drug 
offenses.265  Citing Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Sutley, the 
Morris court held that such legislation did not violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine.266  The legislature’s plenary power to prescribe crimes 
and fix penalties, the court reasoned, necessarily included the power to 
“require th[e] trial courts [to] abrogate or reduce the prior convictions 
and sentences of those convicted and sentenced under the old drug 
enforcement law.”267  Legislation reducing final drug sentences 
therefore did not “infringe on the judicial powers, since at all times it is 
the power of the General Assembly to establish crimes and 
penalties.”268 
Furthermore, such legislation did not deprive individuals of any 
private rights.269  According to the court, “[t]he only party who could 
object is the prisoner, and he can not [sic], where [the retroactive 
legislation] is clearly for his benefit.”270  Although the state “has a 
protected interest in the continuing punishment of convicted criminals,” 
the court reasoned, “it is unquestionable that the state may waive its 
 
263. Id. at 795. 
264. Id.; see Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 
Appeals, 101 A.3d 66, 76 (Pa. 2014) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“I would refrain from expanding 
application of Sutley’s broad-brush approach to proscribing retrospective legislative social-policy 
adjustments merely because they may in some way be said to impact upon final judgments . . . .” 
(citing Justice Robert’s dissent in Sutley)). 
265. State v. Morris, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715–16 (Ohio 1978). 
266. Id. at 716. 
267. Id. at 715. 
268. Id. at 715 (“[T]he General Assembly has not attempted to review the findings of guilt as 
determined by the trial court.  Nor has the General Assembly in effect found that the court has 
abused its discretion in rendering sentences. Rather, the General Assembly has made its own 
determination that the proscribed conduct in the area of drug abuse should be redefined and the 
corresponding sentences revised.”). 
269. See id. at 715–16. 
270. Id. at 715 (citation omitted). 
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vested rights obtained through prior judgments” by passing retroactive 
legislation reducing final sentences.271 
3.  California 
California’s case law points in opposite directions, both for and 
against the retroactive reduction of final sentences.272  In 1965, in In re 
Estrada, the California Supreme Court gave retroactive effect to a 
statutory amendment reducing the penalty for escape from prison.273  
However, the court limited retroactive application to judgments that 
were not final on the effective date of the amendment.274  According to 
the court, “the key date is the date of final judgment.  If the amendatory 
statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the 
judgment of conviction becomes final then, in our opinion, it, and not 
the old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, 
applies.”275  This limitation on the retroactive application of 
ameliorative statutes, the court suggested, was constitutionally 
mandated by the separation of powers: 
When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment 
it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too 
severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the 
commission of the prohibited act.  It is an inevitable inference that the 
Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new 
lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case 
to which it constitutionally could apply.  The amendatory act imposing 
the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the 
defendant of the act is not final.276 
Nearly forty years later, in People v. Bunn, the California Supreme 
Court gave retroactive effect to a (non-ameliorative) criminal statute 
that permitted the refiling of charges against suspected child sex 
offenders in previously dismissed cases.277  Explicitly adopting Plaut’s 
constitutional framework, the court concluded that retroactive 
application of the statute was limited to cases that had not resulted in 
 
271. Id. at 715–16. 
272. See infra notes 273–90 and accompanying text (discussing California cases). 
273. In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 954 (Cal. 1965) (en banc). 
274. See id. at 951. 
275. Id. (emphasis added). 
276. Id. (emphasis added); see People v. Brown, 278 P.3d 1182, 1188 (Cal. 2012) (“Estrada is 
today properly understood . . . [as] articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act 
mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal 
judgments.” (emphasis added)). 
277. People v. Bunn, 37 P.3d 380, 382 (Cal. 2002). 
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final judgment at the time the new statute took effect.278  “Separation of 
powers principles do not preclude the Legislature from amending a 
statute and applying the change to both pending and future cases,” the 
court reasoned, “though any such law cannot readjudicat[e] or otherwise 
disregard judgments that are already final.”279  Relying on Plaut, the 
court concluded that the dismissal of charges against the defendant did 
not become final until after the statute permitting the refiling of charges 
took effect.280  Therefore, the refiling of charges against the defendant 
did not violate the separation of powers.281 
And in People v. Davis, the California Court of Appeals refused to 
give retroactive effect to a statute that would have reduced the 
defendant’s sentence because “the [defendant’s] judgment of conviction 
was final before the amendments became effective, and the retroactive 
application of the amendments to the final judgment would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine.”282  Citing Estrada, the court reasoned 
that “retroactively apply[ing] legislatively mitigated punishment to 
judgments finalized by the courts would be tantamount to readjudicating 
litigated controversies in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.”283 
Although numerous (unpublished) California Court of Appeals 
decisions have similarly refused to give retroactive effect to 
ameliorative criminal statutes,284 a separate line of cases holds 
 
278. See id. (finding Plaut “both consistent with California law and persuasive for state 
separation of powers purposes.”); see also id. at 394 (“Plaut properly preserves and balances the 
respective ‘core functions’ of the two branches.”). 
279. Id. at 390 (internal quotations omitted); see id. at 395–96 (“[A] refiling provision . . . 
cannot be retroactively applied to subvert judgments that became final before the provision took 
effect . . . even where lawmakers have acted for the very best of reasons. . . .  To the extent [that 
new statutes allowing for refiling were not] . . . in effect when a prior judgment of dismissal . . . 
became final within the meaning of Plaut, the state separation of powers doctrine bars reliance on 
[it].” (internal quotations omitted)). 
280. See id. at 397 (stating that dismissal of criminal charges did not become final until 1997, 
one year after the statute permitting refiling took effect). 
281. Id.; see id. at 396 (“[A] judgment is not final for separation of powers purposes, and 
reopening of the case can occur, under the specific terms of refiling legislation already in effect 
when the judicial branch completed its review and ultimately decided the case.  Such 
nonretroactive limitations . . . are constitutionally allowed.” (emphasis added)). 
282. People v. Davis, No. D058659, 2011 WL 5039882, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2011). 
283. Id. at *2. 
284. See, e.g., People v. Colaizzi, No. H036415, 2011 WL 2565390, at *3–4 (Cal.  Ct. App.  
June 29, 2011) (refusing to give retroactive effect to statutory reduction in sentence); People v. 
Romo, No. H035905, 2011 WL 2084567, at *4 (Cal. App. Ct. May 26, 2011) (holding that 
separation-of-powers doctrine prohibited giving retroactive effect to statutory reduction in 
sentence because judgment in defendant’s case became final before statute’s effective date); 
accord. Bennett v. Procunier, 262 Cal. App. 2d 799, 801 (1968) (denying defendant benefit of 
statutory amendment reducing sentence for time spent in custody because “the judgment was final 
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otherwise.  For example, in 2004, in In re Chavez, the California Court 
of Appeals gave retroactive effect to an amendment that reduced the 
defendants’ sentences for tax fraud, even though the defendants’ 
sentences became final before the amendment went into effect.285  In 
stark contrast to Davis, which relied on Estrada in refusing to reduce a 
final sentence, the Chavez court reasoned that “[t]here is nothing in 
Estrada that prohibits the application of revised sentencing provisions 
to persons whose sentences have become final if that is what the 
Legislature intended or what the Constitution requires.”286  The Chavez 
court relied on Way v. Superior Court, a 1978 California Court of 
Appeals decision cited with approval by the California Supreme Court, 
which recognized a narrow exception to the “final judgment rule” for 
reductions in sentences “as an incident of a major and comprehensive 
reform of an entire penal system.”287  According to the Chavez court, 
this exception was satisfied because the legislative motivation for 
reducing the penalty for tax fraud was “to achieve equality and 
uniformity in felony sentencing.”288 
In a concurring opinion in Way, Justice Friedman “defended in even 
stronger terms the Legislature’s power to retroactively apply legislation 
reducing punishment for crime.”289  Dismissing the finality rule set 
forth in Estrada as “semantic smoke” and “archaic dictum” that 
“accords too much sanctity to the rule insulating final criminal 
judgments from the collective impact of penal law revisions,” he argued 
 
before the amendment, and the petitioner is bound by law as it existed at that time”); see also 
Perez v. Roe, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the separation-of-
powers doctrine prohibits giving retroactive effect to a statute reviving childhood sex abuse 
actions in cases that had become final); id. at 776 (“[I]f the Legislature has the power to undo the 
class of judgments covered by [the new statute], then it would also be free to revive any cause of 
action, no matter how old, that had been dismissed under a previously existing statute of 
limitations.  The constitution does not permit such an extension of legislative power.”). 
285. In re Chavez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
286. Compare id. at 404, with Davis, 2011 WL 5039882, at *1–2. 
287. Chavez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404–05 (citing Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 
180 (1977), cited with approval in Younger v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 577 P.2d 1014, 
1024 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). 
288. Chavez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 405; see People v. Cmty. Release Bd., 96 Cal. App. 3d 792, 
800 (1979) (“We therefore take it as settled that legislation reducing punishment for crime [from 
life without possibility of parole to life with possibility of parole] may constitutionally be applied 
to prisoners whose judgments have become final.”); cf. In re Kemp, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 354, 363 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (“[W]e conclude that extending the benefits of the January 25 
amendment to those whose judgments were final prior to the amendment’s effective date would 
not violate separation of powers.”), transferred with instructions to vacate, In re Kemp, 301 P.3d 
1175 (Cal. 2013). 
289. Cmty. Release Bd., 96 Cal. App. 3d at 800 (citing Judge Friedman’s concurrence in 
Way). 
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that: 
There is nothing sacred about a final judgment of imprisonment which 
immunizes it from the Legislature’s power to achieve equality among 
past and new offenders.  In short, the Legislature may grant or 
withhold retroactive amelioration of existing criminal judgments in 
response to some legitimate public purpose.  Parity is the not least of 
those purposes.290 
4.  Summary of State Courts’ Treatment of the 
Reduction of Final Sentences 
State courts are inconsistent in their treatment of legislation that 
reduces final sentences.291  On the one hand are the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sutley, the California Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Estrada and Bunn, and California appeals court decisions 
like Davis that categorically prohibit the reopening of final judgments in 
the criminal context—in effect, following the Chambers line of 
precedent by extending Plaut to the criminal context.292  On the other 
hand are the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Morris, California 
appeals court decisions like Chavez and Way (the latter of which was 
cited favorably by the California Supreme Court), and Justice Roberts’ 
dissent in Sutley, all of which conclude that the reduction of final 
sentences is constitutionally permissible—in effect confirming what 
Dorsey implied.293 
It is significant that in the three states that have looked closely at the 
reduction of final sentences, two (Ohio and California) have decisions 
strongly supporting the reduction of final sentences, and the third 
(Pennsylvania) has a strong dissenting opinion saying as much.294  The 
better argument is the one adopted in Morris, Chavez, Way, and Justice 
Roberts’ Sutley dissent—all of which acknowledge that the reopening of 
final judgments in the criminal context is different from the reopening 
of final judgments in the civil context.295  The former does not offend 
 
290. Way, 74 Cal. App. 3d at 181–82 (Friedman, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
291. See infra Part III.C (discussing conflicting treatment of reduction of final sentences in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California). 
292. See supra Part III.C (discussing Sutley, Estrada, Bunn, and Davis). 
293. See id. (discussing Morris, Chavez, Way, and Sutley dissent). 
294. See id. (discussing Morris, Chavez, Way, and Sutley dissent).  Although California’s case 
law is mixed, one might reasonably argue that the California Supreme Court is more likely to 
uphold the constitutionality of a statute reducing final death sentences because: (i) Bunn is 
distinguishable (i.e., the statute at issue in that case did not reduce sentences); and (ii) California 
Court of Appeals decisions striking down the reduction of final sentences are not published, in 
contrast to Chavez, which is.  See supra notes 272–90 and accompanying text. 
295. See id. (discussing Morris, Chavez, Way, and Sutley dissent). 
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the separation-of-powers doctrine because it is consistent with the 
legislature’s plenary power to prescribe crimes and fix penalties, and it 
also benefits—not burdens—the private rights of individuals (Morris 
and Sutley dissent).296  Furthermore, the reopening of final judgments in 
the criminal context is incidental to the purpose of achieving equality 
and uniformity in sentencing among past and new offenders—
something the judiciary cannot do (Chavez and Way).297  And in the 
death penalty context, there simply is no counterargument that 
retroactive reduction of death sentences would “distort the exercise of 
judicial discretion” by further reducing the sentences of prisoners who 
already received the benefit of judicial discretion at their original 
sentencing.298  Those sentenced to death, almost by definition, have 
received no such benefit. 
Strong as all of these arguments may be, the reduction of final 
sentences remains the exception, not the rule, among states. 
D.  Conclusion: The Reduction of Final Death Sentences 
Does not Violate the Separation of Powers by Interfering 
with the Final Judgments of Courts 
In conclusion, one may reasonably argue that the legislature’s 
reduction of final death sentences does not interfere with the final 
judgments of courts in violation of the separation of powers, for several 
reasons.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Plaut, which held 
that the separation of powers prohibits Congress from reopening final 
judgments in civil cases, did not address the power to reopen final 
judgments in the criminal context.299  U.S. Supreme Court and lower 
federal court decisions before and after Plaut are, at best, unclear on this 
point.300  Although the Supreme Court’s 1934 decision in Chambers 
 
296. See supra Part III.C (discussing Morris and Sutley dissent). 
297. See id. (discussing Chavez and Way); see also Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. 
Chester Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 101 A.3d 66, 76 n.1 (Pa. 2014) (Saylor, J., concurring) 
(“This Court frequently recognizes that the Legislature possesses superior tools and resources in 
making social policy judgments, including comprehensive investigations and policy hearings. . . . 
The upshot of Sutley, however, is that, so long as some final judgment in the judicial system is 
involved, and irrespective of the absence of any harm to vested individual entitlements, the 
General Assembly simply cannot bring such resources to bear to advance beneficial social policy 
aims.  I have strong reservations concerning such an inflexible approach to separation of powers.” 
(citations omitted)); Koenig, supra note 36, at 70 (“[T]here is no other governmental body which 
has the authority to regulate sentences for those who have been sentenced under the authority of a 
now dead legislature.”). 
298. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 787 (Pa. 1977). 
299. See supra Part III.B.1.a (discussing Plaut’s silence regarding reduction of final 
sentences). 
300. See supra Part III.B.1.b–c (discussing Chambers’ implied prohibition on reduction of 
BARRY PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] Going Retro: Abolition For All 721 
and the lower court decisions interpreting it suggest that the legislature 
cannot reopen final judgments in criminal cases, the Court’s recent 
decision in Dorsey, together with the decisions of several lower federal 
courts and state courts, suggest the opposite is true.301  Given the 
recency of Dorsey and its progeny, the better argument is that Plaut is a 
narrow decision that does not prohibit the legislature from reducing 
final sentences.302 
Limiting Plaut’s holding to the civil context suggests why the 
reduction of final sentences may be constitutional, but it does not 
provide an affirmative argument for why such reduction is 
constitutional.  For this, a second limiting principle, drawn from Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in Plaut, is instructive: the separation of powers 
permits a legislature to reduce final sentences where doing so would 
further liberty, “a basic separation-of-powers principle.”303  Because 
legislation that reduces final sentences necessarily furthers the liberty 
(and life) interests of prisoners, does not disadvantage others, and 
contains other liberty-protecting assurances suggested by Justice 
Breyer’s balancing test in Plaut, such legislation does not violate the 
separation of powers.304 
Third, the separation of powers permits a legislature to reopen final 
judgments in criminal cases if courts retain the discretion to reopen.305  
As Plaut’s majority and dissenting opinions make clear, the 
Constitution clearly permits a legislature to “authorize”—but not 
necessarily “mandate”—the reopening of final judgments.306  Death 
penalty repeal legislation that leaves to the discretion of the courts the 
decision of whether to reduce a final death sentence does not violate the 
separation of powers.307 
Finally, state court decisions, on balance, support the constitutionality 
 
final sentences and Dorsey’s support for reduction of final sentences). 
301. See id. (discussing Chambers’ implied prohibition on reduction of final sentences and 
Dorsey’s support for the reduction of final sentences). 
302. See supra Part III.B.1.d (discussing Plaut and Dorsey). 
303. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 241 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring); see 
supra Part III.B.2 (arguing that separation of powers permits legislature to reduce final sentences 
to further liberty). 
304. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 241–43 (arguing that separation of powers permits legislature to 
reduce final sentences to further liberty). 
305. See supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that separation of powers permits legislature to reduce 
final sentences so long as courts retain discretion). 
306. See id.  Compare Plaut, 514 U.S. at 233–34 (distinguishing statute at issue in Plaut from 
Rule 60(b)), with id. at 258–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing statute at issue in Plaut to 
Rule 60(b)). 
307. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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of legislation that reduces final sentences.  These decisions, consistent 
with Justice Breyer’s balancing test, take a functionalist approach 
toward the separation of powers, upholding the reduction of final 
sentences where the legislation benefits—not burdens—the private 
rights of individuals and encourages equality and uniformity in 
sentencing.308 
IV.  THE REDUCTION OF FINAL SENTENCES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS BY INTERFERING WITH THE 
EXECUTIVE’S COMMUTATION POWER 
Even if legislation reducing final sentences does not interfere with the 
final judgments of courts, such legislation gives rise to a second 
separation-of-powers concern: the legislature’s usurpation of the 
executive’s commutation power.309  The commutation power refers to 
the power to reduce sentences, and it is vested in the executive.310  At 
least eight state constitutions allow legislative participation in the 
commutation process.311  In these states, therefore, the legislature’s 
reduction of final sentences most likely does not interfere with the 
executive’s commutation power.312 
In the remaining states, by contrast, the legislature’s reduction of 
final sentences implicates the separation of powers.313  A review of state 
case law reveals two lines of cases: a minority rule holding that the 
legislature’s retroactive reduction of final sentences does not violate the 
executive’s commutation authority, and a majority rule holding that it 
does. 
 
308. See supra Part III.C (discussing state courts’ conflicting treatment of reduction of final 
sentences). 
309. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 36, at 146 (arguing that executive’s pardon power does 
not prohibit legislative reduction of final sentences); Krent, supra note 36, at 66–73 (same). 
310. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 250–51 (2d ed. 
2008).  Pardons, by contrast, do not merely reduce sentences—they absolve the defendant of the 
conviction and sentence.  Id. at 250.  Because “[t]he power of commutation is an adjunct of the 
pardoning power,” the pardon power is often used to refer to both the power to pardon as well as 
to commute.  Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.3d 780, 789 n.12 (Pa. 1977). 
311. See McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004, 1006–07 (Conn. 1988) (“In Connecticut, 
the pardoning power is vested in the legislature.” (citing Palka v. Walker, 195 A. 265 (Conn. 
1938))); Comment, supra note 36, at 146 n.168 (citing ALA. CONST. amend. 38; ARIZ. CONST. 
art. V, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 16; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 6; OR. 
CONST. art. V, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9). 
312. Comment, supra note 36, at 146. 
313. See id. (discussing “judicial adherence” to the “theory that the legislature constitutionally 
lacks the power to grant pardons or clemency and that any legislative reduction or extinguishment 
of penalty would be in the nature of a pardon or clemency”). 
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A.  The Minority Rule: The Reduction of Final Sentences 
Does not Violate the Executive’s Commutation Power 
In Way v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals addressed 
whether a retroactive law that reduced final sentences violated the 
separation of powers by infringing the executive’s power to commute 
sentences.314  While acknowledging that the legislature did not have the 
power to commute prison sentences, and that its legislative reduction of 
final sentences “ha[d] the effect” of commutation, the court held that 
such legislation nevertheless did not constitute “such an invasion of the 
executive power as to make the Act’s retroactivity unconstitutional.”315  
The legislature’s objective, the court noted, was “admittedly one within 
its power”—to “restructure punishments for criminal conduct and to 
make them uniform to the extent reasonably possible.”316  The court 
contrasted this objective with the objective of executive commutations, 
which is to show “mercy, grace or forgiveness toward past 
offenders.”317 
Because the objective of the legislation was within the legislature’s 
power, the court concluded that the infringement on the executive’s 
commutation power was merely “incidental” and therefore 
permissible.318  Although sentence reduction “may be traditionally 
associated” with the executive, this does not mean that it “cannot 
incidentally be used by” the legislature.319  According to the Court, 
There can be no rigid line over which one department cannot 
traverse. . . .  Each branch must in some degree exercise some of the 
functions of others; it is only when one branch exercises the complete 
power constitutionally delegated to another that the action violates the 
constitutional distribution of powers.320 
In Younger v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, the Supreme 
Court of California followed the reasoning of Way in upholding 
legislation that authorized destruction of conviction records relating to 
the possession of marijuana.321  Such legislation, the court held, did not 
violate the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
 
314. Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 180 (1977), cited with approval in Younger 
v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 577 P.2d 1014, 1024 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). 
315. Id. at 177. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 177–78. 
319. Id. at 178. 
320. Id. 
321. Younger v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 577 P.2d 1014, 1024 (Cal. 1978). 
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executive.322  “Any infringement on the power of executive clemency is 
thus purely incidental to the main purpose of the statute,” i.e., reducing 
the adverse social and personal effects of a conviction that might linger 
long after the prescribed punishment has been completed, “which is 
well within the province of the Legislature.”323 
California appeals courts have likewise followed Way’s purpose test 
in rejecting separation-of-powers challenges alleging legislative 
infringement of the pardon power.324  In Chavez, the California Court of 
Appeals relied on Way in holding that the retroactive reduction of final 
sentences “did not infringe the governor’s pardon power because the 
motivation for the law was not to pardon, but to restructure punishment.  
The lessening of petitioners’ sentences here is incidental to the 
legitimate motivation of correcting an anomaly in the law . . . .”325 
In 1986, in Kent County Prosecutor v. Kent County Sheriff, the 
Michigan Supreme Court was equally divided on the question of 
whether a statute providing for the early release of prisoners infringed 
on the executive’s pardon power.326  Judge Boyle stated that the act 
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the Governor’s 
power of commutation was exclusive and the legislature’s reduction of 
sentences was “a commutation in every sense of the word.”327  Judge 
Levin disagreed.328  “Any general mercy arising from the exercise of 
the power conferred by the act,” Judge Levin stated, “is simply 
incidental to the primary goal of relieving county jail overcrowding, a 
goal clearly within the plenary power of the Legislature.”329 
After rehearing, the Michigan Supreme Court in Kent County 
Prosecutor v. Kent County Sheriff unanimously held that the early-
release statute did not infringe the executive’s pardon power.330  Like in 
 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 177–78 (1977) (holding that 
“shortening of existing prison terms” was “purely incidental to the main legislative purpose” of 
uniformity in sentencing). 
325. In re Chavez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
326. Kent Cnty. Prosecutor v. Kent Cnty. Sheriff (Kent Cnty. I), 391 N.W. 2d 341 (Mich. 
1986), rev’d on reh’g, Kent Cnty. Prosecutor v. Kent Cnty. Sheriff (Kent Cnty. II), 409 N.W.2d 
202 (Mich. 1987). 
327. Kent Cnty. I, 391 N.W.2d at 344. 
328. Id. at 350 (Levin, J., dissenting). 
329. Id. 
330. Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 206–07.  Compare id. at 208 (Boyle, J., concurring) (“I 
concur in the result of the majority because, upon consideration of the new arguments presented 
since this Court’s original determination in this case, I am now convinced that the grant of power 
to the Legislature permitting indeterminate sentences allows the reductions called for in the jail 
overcrowding act.”), with Kent Cnty. I, 391 N.W. 2d at 344 (Boyle, J.) (holding that legislature’s 
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Way, the court began by examining the purpose of the statute, which 
was to “to reduce or eliminate the evils fostered by overcrowded 
jails.”331  This purpose, the court noted, implicated the public health and 
welfare and was therefore well within the Legislature’s plenary 
power.332 
The court next turned to the governmental action contemplated by the 
act—the reduction of sentences.333  “If the effect of the jail 
overcrowding act [i.e., sentence reduction] is to violate a constitutional 
command,” the court stated, “then no laudable legislative purpose can 
save the enactment.”334  The court concluded that, although the statute 
reduced sentences, it did not permit “commutations” in violation of the 
state constitution, for two reasons.335  First, the commutation process 
did not resemble the process mandated by the early-release statute.336  
Executive commutations, the court reasoned: 
[A]re acts of individualized clemency, typically motivated by the 
prisoner’s personal characteristics and behavior in jail or prison.  In 
contrast, the sentence reductions under the act are prompted by 
generalized conditions of the jail or jails within the county, not by the 
unique characteristics of the affected prisoners.337 
Second, the beneficiaries of commutation differed from those 
benefitted by the early-release statute.338  “Commutations are directly 
aimed at benefiting the released prisoner, and no others. . . .  Reduction 
in sentences due to jail overcrowding,” by contrast, “are directly aimed 
at alleviating that emergency situation.”339  As a result, “released 
prisoners are not the only ones affected by sentence reductions”—
 
reduction of sentences violated executive’s pardon power). 
331. Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 204 (“In assessing the validity of a statute against a 
constitutional challenge, an appropriate starting point is the legislative purpose in enacting the 
statute.”). 
332. Id. at 205. 
333. See id. at 205–06. 
334. Id. at 205. 
335. Compare id. at 206–07 (adopting Judge Levin’s analysis in Kent County I, which found 
no infringement of the Governor’s commutation power), with Kent County I, 391 N.W.2d at 344 
(Boyle, J.) (“[T]he sentences of the prisoners who benefit from an application of the county jail 
overcrowding act are reduced from the time specified by the sentencing judge.  This, in my 
estimation, is a commutation in every sense of the word.”). 
336. See Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 206; see also Kent Cnty. I, 391 N.W.3d at 348 n.20 
(Levin, J., dissenting) (contrasting character of sentencing proceeding, “which emphasized that 
the sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and offender,” with 
“the massive, generally nonindividualized reduction of sentences pursuant to [the early-release 
statute]”). 
337. Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 206. 
338. See id. 
339. Id. 
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prisoners still confined (and prison officials) enjoy less crowded 
conditions.340  “The incidental benefit that accrues to the prisoners 
released under the act,” the court concluded, “does not amount to an 
unconstitutional invasion of the powers of the executive branch.”341 
In 2001, in People v. Matelic, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
similarly held that a statute providing parole eligibility for drug 
offenders previously sentenced to mandatory terms of LWOP did not 
violate the governor’s commutation power.342  According to the court, 
the Legislature enacted the statutes “to create uniformity” in the law “by 
bringing preamendment sentences into line with the terms of 
punishment to be imposed under the amended [law],” “to alleviate to 
some degree the persistent problem of prison overcrowding,” “to save 
taxpayers the cost of lifetime incarcerations,” and “to reduce the 
likelihood that other felons who were violent might obtain early release 
on parole because of prison overcrowding.”343  Finding that “the 
primary purposes of [the parole eligibility law] all serve the public 
good,” the court concluded that the Legislature acted properly to the 
extent that “it incidentally reduced the prison terms of prisoners 
previously convicted of drug offenses that carried life sentences without 
the possibility of parole.”344 
In 1964, in People v. Pate, the Supreme Court of Illinois similarly 
held that retroactive application of a statute allowing resentenced 
prisoners to receive credit for time served on an erroneous sentence did 
not amount “to a pardon or commutation of a valid sentence. . . .  The 
legislature has not attempted to change the duration of the sentence, but 
merely to recognize the gross inequity in the legal reasoning that would 
ignore penitentiary time served for the same offense.”345  To hold 
otherwise, the court reasoned: 
 
340. Id. at 206; see id. at 207 (“[C]onditions arising from jail and prison overcrowding can 
lead to suits against jail and prison officials . . . .”). 
341. Id. at 204; see Kent Cnty. I, 391 N.W.2d at 350–52 (Levin, J., dissenting) (citing Way, 
and stating that “[a]ny general mercy arising from the exercise of the power conferred by the act 
is simply incidental to the primary goal of relieving county jail overcrowding, a goal clearly 
within the plenary power of the Legislature.”).  Several years before Kent County I, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that a law providing for reduction of final indeterminate sentences in order to 
reduce prison overcrowding did not infringe the executive’s pardon power, based on a 
constitutional provision explicitly empowering the legislature to provide “for the detention and 
release of persons imprisoned or detained on [indeterminate] sentences.” Oakland Cnty. Pros. 
Att’y v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 305 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Mich. 1981). 
342. People v. Matelic, 641 N.W.2d 252, 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), overruled on other 
grounds, People v. Stewart, 698 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Mich. 2005). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. (emphasis added) 
345. People ex rel. Gregory v. Pate, 203 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ill. 1964). 
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[W]ould perpetuate a situation that the legislature clearly sought to 
eliminate, and would ignore the express intention that the remedial 
provisions of the Code be applied retroactively.  No rational purpose 
would be served in treating persons resentenced prior to January 1, 
1964, in a completely different way than those resentenced after that 
date.346 
The Supreme Court of Ohio took a different tack in rejecting a 
separation-of-powers challenge to a retroactive ameliorative law.347  In 
State v. Morris, the court held that a law reducing final sentences did 
not infringe the executive’s pardon power because the authority to 
commute sentences was not exclusive to the Governor but rather was 
shared with the legislature.348  Under the Ohio Constitution, the court 
explained, “the Governor’s powers are those that are specifically 
granted,” whereas the legislature’s powers are those not specifically 
limited by the state constitution.349  Although the Ohio Constitution 
explicitly authorized the Governor to commute sentences, it did not—
either explicitly or implicitly—prohibit the legislature from doing 
likewise.350  Because Ohio’s Constitution did not prohibit the 
legislature from exercising the pardon power, the court reasoned, that 
power was vested in the legislative branch.351  The explicit grant of the 
pardon power to the Governor was not, therefore, a limitation on the 
power of the legislative branch, but rather a special grant of authority to 
the executive to grant pardons in certain instances.352  In short, the Ohio 
Constitution did not take away the legislature’s pardon power; it merely 
 
346. Id. at 427; see Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 794 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (“While the Pennsylvania Constitution does not require that those sentenced before 
the adoption of ameliorative legislation receive the benefits of that legislation, it should not be 
interpreted to prohibit the Legislature from equalizing the treatment of such offenders when it 
considers such treatment to serve the public interest.  The power to determine what classes of 
offenders should benefit by the reduced penalties provided for in the Controlled Substance Act is 
a necessary incident to the Legislature’s power to enact legislation, such as the Controlled 
Substance Act, which changes the penalties for certain crimes.”).  Notably, in 1918, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois held otherwise—invalidating legislation reducing final sentences on separation 
of powers grounds.  See People ex rel. Brundage v. La Buy, 120 N.E. 537, 538 (1918) (“The 
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, ‘for all offenses,’ is vested 
in the Governor and cannot be vested in another officer or body, directly or indirectly, by act of 
the Legislature, which the amendment [reducing final sentences] attempted to do.”). 
347. See State v. Morris, 378 N.E.2d 708, 713–14 (Ohio 1978). 
348. Id. 
349. Id. at 714 (“[T[he state Constitution does not grant power to the General Assembly, but 
only provides limitations to that power.”). 
350. Id. at 713–14. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
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shared that power with the executive.353  Because the power was not 
exclusive, the court held, there was no separation-of-powers problem.354 
Together, these cases stand for the proposition that legislation 
reducing final sentences does not violate the executive’s pardon 
authority in two circumstances.  First, the legislature’s reduction of final 
sentences is permissible when the legislature retains the commutation 
power, as was the case in Morris.355  Second, even if the legislature 
lacks the power to commute, its reduction of final sentences is 
nevertheless permissible when the purpose (e.g., uniformity, health and 
welfare, cost avoidance) and effect (e.g., generalized process benefitting 
the public and, only incidentally, prisoners) of such legislation differs 
from the purpose (e.g., mercy or forgiveness) and effect (individualized 
process benefitting one prisoner) of commutation, as was the case in 
Way, Kent County, and their progeny.356 
Several other reasons support the wisdom of the minority rule.  First, 
the system of checks and balances already provides the executive with 
protection against legislation that violates the separation of powers.  If a 
governor believes that his or her commutation authority is threatened by 
an act of the legislature, a governor can exercise the veto power.357  
This structural safeguard cautions against a restrictive interpretation of 
 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 714; see Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 793 n.9 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (“The constitutional provision granting the executive power to pardon, Pa. Const. art. 
IV, § 9, is not exclusive by its terms, and there is no reason to construe it as exclusive. . . .  Thus, 
the executive’s power to pardon does not impliedly prohibit the Legislature from enacting statutes 
in the nature of general pardons.”); id. at 798 (Manderino, J., dissenting) (“The authority of the 
legislature is unlimited so long as the exercise of that authority does not violate any constitutional 
limitations.  The authority of the executive, on the other hand, extends only so far as is expressly 
provided in the Constitution.” (citations omitted)). 
355. See supra notes 347–54 and accompanying text (discussing Morris, which held that law 
reducing final sentences did not infringe executive’s pardon power because authority to commute 
sentences was not exclusive to Governor). 
356. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Way, Kent County, and their progeny, which upheld 
laws reducing final sentences). 
357. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2012, ENACTING LEGISLATION: 
VETO, VETO OVERRIDE AND EFFECTIVE DATE 156–58 tbl. 3.16 (2012), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/BOSTable3.16.pdf (compiling veto powers in 
each state); see Kent Cnty. Prosecutor v. Kent Cnty. Sheriff (Kent Cnty. II), 409 N.W.2d 202, 206 
n.8 (Mich. 1987) (“It is significant to note that when the jail overcrowding act was passed, 
Governor Milliken signed it without any indication of qualms that it would invade his executive 
powers of clemency.  Also, although the present litigation has been pending for some years, 
Governor Blanchard has not sought to intervene to protect his powers. . . .  [W]e can presume that 
each Governor recognized the need for legislation dealing with overcrowding in county jails and 
approved the method chosen by the Legislature to deal with this problem.” (citations omitted)).  
But see Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477, 480–81 (Me. 1985) (rejecting argument that “Governor 
intended that his signature would be a blanket exercise of his commutation power”). 
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the legislature’s power to reduce sentences.358 
A second reason that the reduction of final sentences does not 
infringe the executive’s commutation power is consistency.  A governor 
can commute sentences that are not yet final.359  Likewise, it is not a 
violation of the commutation power for a legislature to retroactively 
reduce sentences that are not yet final.360 
If the legislature’s reduction of sentences does not infringe the 
executive’s commutation power before finality, it should not violate the 
executive’s commutation power after finality.361 
A third reason that the reduction of final sentences does not infringe 
the executive’s commutation power relies on federal law.  The 
Constitution explicitly grants pardon authority to the President.362  
Although the Department of Justice has taken the position that this grant 
of authority to the President implicitly precludes Congress from 
exercising such authority itself, Congress “has never acknowledged that 
it lacks the authority to grant at least general amnesties [i.e., pardons 
extended to whole classes or communities, instead of individuals] if not 
pardons to specified individuals.”363  Indeed, Congress “has debated 
bills proposing amnesties on a number of occasions and has asserted its 
constitutional authority to adopt such legislation.”364  The Supreme 
Court “has never directly resolved the question of Congress’s pardon 
and amnesty authority,” but early cases suggest that Congress retains 
such authority, at least with respect to general amnesties.365  As the 
 
358. See Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 206 n.8 (recognizing ability of governors to challenge 
“inva[sion] . . . [of their] executive powers of clemency”). 
359. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“The executive can reprieve or pardon all 
offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by 
classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress.”). 
360. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995) (“Congress can always 
revise the judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is 
retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that 
were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.” (emphasis 
added)). 
361. See Krent, supra note 36, at 71 (“If congressional action paralleling pardons of 
individuals before conviction does not violate the President’s pardon authority, it is difficult to 
understand why congressional action after sentencing would be unconstitutional.”). 
362. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
363. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative 
Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1269 
(2003); see id. (“[A] bill granting clemency to persons already convicted and serving their 
sentences ‘constitutes an obvious usurpation of the pardoning power and renders the bill 
constitutionally infirm.’” (quoting Letter from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable James D. Eastland (Feb. 25, 1974))). 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 1272–73. 
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Court stated in Brown v. Walker: 
Although the Constitution vests in the President “power to grant 
reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in 
cases of impeachment,” this power has never been held to take from 
Congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty, and . . . “extends 
to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time 
after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or 
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”366 
Fourth, as the California Supreme Court stated in Way, the legislative 
reduction of final sentences is not a complete usurpation of the 
executive’s commutation power.367  The executive still retains a range 
of pardon and commutation options.  For example, suppose that 
legislation reduced final death sentences to LWOP.  The executive 
could further reduce those LWOP sentences by commuting the sentence 
to life in prison with the possibility of parole, by commuting the 
sentence to a term of years, or by pardoning the person altogether.368  
Because the executive retains this power notwithstanding the 
legislature’s sentence reduction, such a reduction hardly seems to tip the 
scales toward a constitutional violation. 
B.  The Majority Rule: The Reduction of Final Sentences 
Violates the Executive’s Commutation Power 
Although court decisions in California, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio 
persuasively hold that a legislature’s reduction of final sentences does 
not violate the executive’s commutation authority, these cases appear to 
 
366. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896); see The Laura v. Bridge-Port Steamboat 
Co., 114 U.S. 411 (1885) (“[I]n none of the cases in this court or in the Circuit and District Courts 
of the United States, involving the operation or effect of such warrants of remission [of fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures], was it ever suggested or intimated that the legislation was an 
encroachment upon the President’s power of pardon.”); see also Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 
A.2d 780, 788 (Pa. 1977) (“[F]ederal courts have adopted the principle of the English common 
law which recognized an inherent power of pardon in the legislative branch under that body’s 
supreme lawmaking power . . . .”). 
367. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 178 (1977) (“Each branch must in some 
degree exercise some of the functions of others; it is only when one branch exercises the complete 
power constitutionally delegated to another that the action violates the constitutional distribution 
of powers.” (emphasis added)). 
368. See Oakland Cnty. Pros. Att’y v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 305 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Mich. 
1981) (“[T]he Legislature has done nothing to directly interfere with the Governor’s function; he 
remains free to pardon or commute the sentences of individual prisoners as he, in his discretion, 
feels the circumstances warrant.”); see also Koenig, supra note 36, at 69–70 (“Where the 
Legislature reduces penalties, and makes that retroactive to those in prison, clearly the Legislature 
is not co-opting the Governor’s power to grant commutations, as the Governor is free to grant any 
commutation he or she desires.  There is no interference with the carrying out of that 
gubernatorial right.”). 
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be in the minority.369  At least eight state high courts have gone the 
other way, holding that legislation that reduced final sentences violated 
the executive’s commutation power.370  For example, in Bossie v. State, 
the Supreme Court of Maine held that a statute reducing final sentences 
by changing the calculation of “good-time” credits violated the 
separation of powers.371  Rather than carefully distinguishing between 
the reduction of sentences and executive commutation, as the courts did 
in Way and Kent County, the Maine Supreme Court simply stated that 
“the separation of powers issues must be dealt with in a formal rather 
than functional manner.”372  The power to commute sentences, the court 
reasoned, was “explicitly and exclusively granted to the executive.”373  
Therefore, because the statute “shortened (commuted) the lengths of 
existing sentences,” the legislature had “interfere[d] with the 
executive’s explicit and exclusive grant of the commutation power” in 
violation of the constitution.374 
In State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals similarly held that a statute reducing the final sentences of 
those convicted of marijuana offenses resulted in “commutation” and 
therefore violated the Texas Constitution, which “plac[ed] the power of 
clemency in the hands of the Governor, acting upon the 
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”375  Unlike the 
court in Way, the Smith court was not persuaded that the legislature’s 
goal of uniformity in sentencing rendered its reduction of sentences 
constitutional.376  According to the court: 
The Texas Controlled Substances Act clearly represents a re-thinking, 
a change in attitude toward marihuana-related offenses and the 
penalties to be imposed.  It was in fact remedial legislation as it related 
 
369. See supra Part IV.A (discussing state court decisions permitting legislative reduction of 
final sentences). 
370. See infra notes 371–92 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions 
prohibiting legislative reduction of final sentences as violation of executive’s commutation 
authority). 
371. Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477, 479–480 (Me. 1985). 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Id.; see Littlefield v. Caton, 856 F.2d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the application 
of Bossie furthered “state’s paramount interests in maintaining the integrity of the executive 
branch of state government and in applying the correct rule of law” (citing Bossie, 488 A.2d at 
480)); Austin v. State, 663 A.2d 62, 64 (Me. 1995) (stating that parole board’s “reduction of 
Austin’s life sentence was the equivalent of a commutation, and thus intruded on the power 
reserved to the Governor by Article V of the Maine Constitution.” (citing Bossie, 488 A.2d at 
479–80)). 
375. 500 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
376. See id. at 104. 
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to possession of marihuana.  And the Legislature was not unaware of 
the large number of inmates in the Department of Corrections as well 
as those who have already been released who suffered some of the 
harsher penalties authorized by the former law which will no longer be 
imposed for the same type of offense. . . .  There can be no question 
but that the Legislature acted with worthy motives in mind, but 
today’s holding [that the statute violates the executive’s commutation 
power] cannot come as a surprise to the Legislature . . . .377 
Likewise, in People v. Herrera, the Supreme Court of Colorado held 
that a statute providing for a right of review of final sentences, in light 
of Colorado’s amendment of its criminal code to reduce final sentences 
for most offenses, violated the executive’s commutation authority.378  
The court began by recognizing and agreeing with the “laudable, 
beneficent purposes motivating the enactment” of the statute—the 
equalization of existing sentences in light of reductions of sentences for 
future crimes.379  “[T]he criminal justice process,” the court noted,  
[S]ometimes results in imperfect justice which in extreme cases cries 
out for correction.  This is particularly so in the area of imposition of 
sentences for criminal misconduct.  The methods and means by which 
correction of such inequities and injustices may be attained, however, 
are circumscribed by constitutional limitations.380 
According to the court, “the power of commutation is the power to 
reduce punishment from a greater to a lesser sentence,” and this power 
was exclusive to the governor.381  “Any attempt, therefore, to exercise 
such power by the judicial department” by reducing sentences, even 
though legislatively sanctioned, the court held, “would be a violation of 
the doctrine of separation of powers under Article III of the Colorado 
Constitution.”382  Like the court in Bossie, the Herrera court favored 
formalism over functionalism, declining to distinguish between the 
legislative reduction of sentences and executive commutation.383  
Significantly, Herrera also went further than Bossie and Smith, 
invalidating a statute that made the court’s reduction of final sentences 
 
377. Id. at 104. 
378. 516 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo. 1973). 
379. Id. at 628. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. at 629.  The court also reasoned that the legislature’s conferral of such power on the 
judiciary was, itself, a violation of the separation of powers.  See id. at 628 (stating that 
legislature was “powerless to confer executive powers upon the judiciary”). 
383. See id. at 628–29 (“Implied in this provision [providing for right of review of final 
sentences] is the authority to reduce a sentence after a final conviction—the power of 
commutation.”). 
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merely discretionary.384  Courts in Nebraska,385 Pennsylvania,386 
Louisiana,387 Mississippi,388 and North Dakota389 have similarly held 
that legislation reducing final sentences violates the executive’s pardon 
power.390 
Together, these cases stand for the straightforward proposition that a 
legislature’s reduction of final sentences violates the executive’s 
 
384. Id. at 627 (stating that amendment “authorizes postconviction review where it is alleged 
‘[t]hat there has been a significant change in the law, applied to applicant’s conviction or 
sentence, allowing in the interest of justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard.’” 
(emphasis added)). 
385. Boston v. Black, 340 N.W.2d 401, 408 (Neb. 1983) (stating that “denying retroactive 
application of the [statute’s] good time sentence reduction provisions to those serving sentences 
imposed prior to its effective date” promoted “the preservation of the separation of governmental 
powers embedded in our state Constitution”); see State v. Philipps, 521 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Neb. 
1994) (“[T]o interpret a statute such that it would reduce, without the approval of the Board of 
Pardons, a sentence imposed prior to its enactment would render the statute unconstitutional, for 
it would permit a legislative invasion of the power of commutation constitutionally consigned to 
the board.”). 
386. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782, 789 (Pa. 1977) (holding that statute that 
reduced final sentences for those convicted of marijuana possession violated separation of powers 
because it “operated as a legislative impairment of existing final legal judgments,” but strongly 
implying that statute also violated separation of powers because “there is no power of pardon or 
commutation in the legislature and . . . the power is specifically and singularly granted to the 
executive branch”). 
387. State v. Dick, 951 So. 2d 124, 133 (La. 2007) (“[A]llowing the courts to reduce the 
offenders’ final sentences would, in effect, commute a valid sentence, a power the legislature 
knows to be constitutionally reserved to the executive branch.”). 
388. Whittington v. Stevens, 73 So. 2d 137, 140 (Miss. 1954) (holding that, although “the 
legislature was prompted by the highest humanitarian motives,” statute providing for reduction of 
sentence based on incapacity of prisoners violated commutation power vested in governor); id. 
(“Where the power to commute sentences is expressly or impliedly vested in the governor or a 
board, that authority alone can grant a commutation; and no other person, official, or body can be 
empowered to grant a commutation.”), cited with favor in Corley v. State, 584 So. 2d 769, 775 
(Miss. 1991). 
389. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 472 n.2 (N.D. 1986) (“Legislation lessening 
punishment may not be applied to final convictions because this would constitute an invalid 
exercise by the Legislature of the executive pardoning power.” (citing Ex parte Chambers, 285 
N.W. 862 (N.D. 1939))). 
390. Decisions from the Supreme Courts of Idaho and Missouri suggest that these courts 
would also hold that legislation reducing final sentences violates the executive’s pardon power.  
Cf. Bates v. Murphy, 796 P.2d 116, 119 (Idaho 1990) (citing Bossie, and stating that discharges 
by Commission of Pardons and Parole “are in fact commutations because they shorten the term of 
the sentences imposed by the court.  Since the discharges granted to the petitioners in the present 
case did not comply with the procedures set forth in Article IV, § 7, of the Idaho Constitution, 
they are void”); State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 124 (1883) (holding that statute that retroactively 
removed restriction prohibiting ex-offenders from testifying as witnesses violated governor’s 
pardon power because “the only method of relief from the disabilities annexed to such judgment 
is by a full pardon of the offense”), distinguished on other grounds by State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, 
247 S.W.2d 969, 972 (Mo. 1952)). 
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commutation authority.391  According to the Herrera court, this remains 
true even if courts are given the discretion to reopen, because the 
legislature is “powerless to confer executive powers upon the 
judiciary.”392  Importantly, the majority rule does not appear to prohibit 
a legislature from authorizing (or perhaps even mandating) the executive 
to review the sentences of those finally sentenced under an old law and, 
in its discretion, to commute those sentences consistent with the new 
law.393 
C.  Conclusion: The Reduction of Final Death Sentences 
Does not Violate the Separation of Powers by Interfering 
with the Executive’s Commutation Power 
In conclusion, it is highly unclear whether the reduction of final death 
sentences interferes with the Executive’s commutation power because 
case law argues in both directions.  Under the minority rule, retroactive 
death penalty repeal would almost certainly not violate the executive’s 
commutation power for one of two reasons.394  First, the commutation 
power may not be exclusive to the executive; it may instead be shared 
with the legislature, thereby eliminating any separation-of-powers 
problem.395 
Second, even if the commutation power were exclusive to the 
executive, the reduction of final death sentences would most likely not 
 
391. See supra notes 371–90 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions 
prohibiting legislative reduction of final sentences as violation of executive’s commutation 
authority). 
392. See People v. Herrera, 516 P.2d 626, 628 (Colo. 1973) (holding that Colorado statute 
providing for right of review of final sentences violated executive’s commutation authority). 
393. See Comment, supra note 36, at 146 (discussing Washington law by which legislature 
“circumvent[ed]” separation of powers challenge by directing board of prison terms parole to 
review sentences of prisoners sentenced under old law and giving it discretion to reduce such 
sentences in accordance with new law); see also Dugger v. Williams, 593 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. 
1991) (per curiam) (“On its face, the statute does no more than direct DOC to recommend [to the 
Governor and Cabinet] a commutation of sentence. . . .  The executive still retains full discretion, 
subject only to its own Rules of Executive Clemency and the state Constitution, to accept or 
reject the recommendation. There thus is no usurpation of executive authority here.” (emphasis 
added)).  Such legislation would likely give rise to yet another separation of powers concern—
this time, between the executive and the judiciary.  See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948) (holding that Congress cannot vest review of the 
decisions of Article III courts in executive officials).  Because such legislation would not vest in 
the executive any authority that it does not already have (i.e., the power to commute sentences), 
such legislation most likely would not violate the separation of powers.  See generally Peterson, 
supra note 363, at 1250–60 (discussing congressional imposition of procedures on the 
Presidential pardon process). 
394. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text (discussing minority rule holding that 
legislative reduction of sentences does not violate executive’s commutation authority). 
395. See supra notes 347–54 and accompanying text (discussing Morris). 
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offend the separation of powers because it is not the same as 
commutation in either purpose or effect.396  Like the statute at issue in 
Way, the purpose of retroactive death penalty repeal is not mercy or 
forgiveness—it is uniformity.397  Furthermore, like the statute at issue 
in Kent County, the reduction of sentences through retroactive death 
penalty repeal differs markedly from commutation in both process and 
intended beneficiaries.398  Commutation is a highly individualized 
process involving consideration of a prisoner’s “personal characteristics 
and behavior”; retroactive death penalty repeal turns on a single, general 
factor that has absolutely nothing to do with a prisoner’s personal 
characteristics or behavior: the date of the crime.399  And while 
commutation benefits some individual offenders but not others, 
retroactive death penalty repeal benefits literally everyone who 
committed a death-eligible crime before the passage of the statute.400  
This includes those known (i.e., prisoners awaiting trial or sentencing 
and those finally sentenced to death row) and unknown (i.e., those who 
committed crimes in “cold cases” and have not yet been arrested).401  
Importantly, retroactive death penalty repeal also benefits the public, 
more generally, which is spared the expense of maintaining the death 
penalty through the payment of taxes.402 
Under the majority rule, by contrast, the legislature’s reduction of 
final death sentences would most likely violate the executive’s 
commutation power unless the authority to reduce sentences was given 
to the executive and made discretionary.403 
 
396. See supra notes 314–46 and accompanying text (discussing, among others, Way and Kent 
County). 
397. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 177–78 (1977); see also supra notes 
314–20 and accompanying text (discussing Way). 
398. See Kent Cnty. Prosecutor v. Kent Cnty. Sheriff (Kent Cnty. II), 409 N.W.2d 202, 206 
(Mich. 1987); see also supra notes 330–41 and accompanying text (discussing Kent County II). 
399. See Kent Cnty. II, 409 N.W.2d at 206. 
400. See, e.g., The SAFE California Act § 10, supra note 39 (retroactively reducing all death 
sentences). 
401. See id. 
402. See People v. Matelic, 641 N.W.2d 252, 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding law that 
reduced final sentences, in part, to “save taxpayers the cost of lifetime incarcerations”); see also 
The SAFE California Act § 2(10), supra note 39 (“Retroactive application of this act will end a 
costly and ineffective practice.”); supra notes 342–44 and accompanying text (discussing 
Matelic). 
403. See supra notes 371–94 and accompanying text (discussing majority rule holding that 
legislative reduction of sentences violates executive’s commutation authority). 
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V.  THE REDUCTION OF FINAL SENTENCES DOES NOT VIOLATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SAVINGS AND RETROACTIVITY CLAUSES 
In addition to separation-of-powers concerns, two constitutional 
impediments to retroactive death penalty-repeal legislation remain: 
constitutional savings clauses, which are extremely rare, and 
constitutional retroactivity clauses, which are only slightly less so.404 
A.  Constitutional Savings Clauses 
As discussed in Part I, the majority of states have enacted general 
savings statutes that create a presumption against retroactive laws.405  
That presumption can be overcome by explicit language or other clear 
indicia of legislative intent indicating that a new law is intended to be 
retroactive.406  Three states—Florida, New Mexico, and Oklahoma—
however, have saving clauses in their constitutions.407  These 
constitutional savings clauses create not a statutory presumption but 
instead a rule against retroactivity that cannot be overcome by a new 
law.408  In theory, at least, these state legislatures are “powerless to 
lessen penalties for past transgressions; to do so would require 
constitutional revision.”409  In practice, however, constitutional savings 
clauses have not stopped legislatures in these states from passing 
legislation that retroactively reduces penalties, nor have they stopped 
 
404. See infra Part IV.A–B and accompanying text (discussing constitutional savings clauses 
and constitutional retroactivity clauses).  Unlike separation-of-powers concerns, which arise only 
when legislation reduces final sentences, constitutional savings clauses and retroactivity clauses 
implicate all retroactive legislation, regardless of whether it disturbs final sentences or pending 
cases.  State constitutional contract clauses, which prohibit the retroactive impairment of 
contracts, are no impediment to retroactive death penalty repeal legislation because they apply 
only to civil legislation.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) 
(distinguishing the federal “Ex Post Facto Clause,” which “flatly prohibits retroactive application 
of penal legislation,” from the federal Contracts Clause, which “prohibits States from passing 
another type of retroactive legislation, laws ‘impairing the Obligation of Contracts’”); see also L. 
Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expectation That Public Officials Will Act Consistently, 46 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 549, 561 (1998) (stating that the federal Contracts Clause governs retroactivity of 
non-penal statutes). 
405. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing state general savings statutes). 
406. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (discussing presumption against 
retroactivity). 
407. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 33–34; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54.  
The Arizona Constitution has a savings clause, but it only applies to actions pending when 
Arizona became a state.  ARIZ. CONST. art. XXII, §§ 1–2.  Because such legislation is not at issue 
in the context of retroactive death penalty repeal, Arizona’s constitutional savings clause is not 
discussed here. 
408. See Comment, supra note 36, at 129 (discussing constitutional savings clauses). 
409. Id. 
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courts in these states from upholding such legislation.410  As a result, it 
is far from certain that constitutional savings clauses necessarily 
prohibit the retroactive reduction of death sentences.  And even if they 
do, they are only applicable to three states.411 
B.  Constitutional Retroactivity Clauses 
In addition to the separation-of-powers doctrine and state 
constitutional savings clauses, state constitutional provisions prohibiting 
“retroactive” (or “retrospective”) laws present another possible 
constraint on the legislature’s power to enact retroactive laws.412  
Importantly, constitutional retroactivity clauses are the exception, not 
the rule; only eleven state constitutions contain such provisions,413 
which generally take one of three forms. 
The first type of constitutional retroactivity clause is one in which the 
prohibition on “retroactive” (or “retrospective”) laws applies only in the 
civil context.  Colorado’s constitution, for example, provides that “[n]o 
ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or 
retrospective in its operation . . . shall be passed by the general 
assembly.”414  According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the 
“retrospective” clause “pertains to civil statutes and does not provide 
any independent basis for increased protection from retroactive criminal 
laws . . . .  The retrospective law prohibition is the civil parallel of the 
 
410. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 753 So. 2d 1244, 1253 (Fla. 2000) (holding that, 
notwithstanding constitutional savings clause, trial court properly gave retroactive effect to statute 
providing death row prisoners with choice of death by lethal injection or electrocution); State v. 
Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 205 (N.M. 1969) (per curiam) (supplemental opinion) (holding that 
constitutional savings clause was not violated by giving effect to statute that repealed death 
penalty retroactively in pending cases, and stating that “[w]e perceive no reason under the 
constitution why [the legislature] could not make the law applicable in situations where, as here, 
the case was pending on appeal”); Pollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400, 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) 
(holding that, notwithstanding constitutional savings clause prohibiting retroactive legislation, 
“the Legislature may make retroactive a statute lessening the punishment and classification of an 
offense, but the intent to do so must be affirmatively expressed in said statute”); see also N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 12-2A-16(c) (West, Westlaw through 2nd Reg. Sess. of 2014 Legis. Sess.) (“If a 
criminal penalty for a violation of a statute or rule is reduced by an amendment, the penalty, if not 
already imposed, must be imposed under the statute or rule as amended.”); id. § 12-2A-8 (“A 
statute or rule operates prospectively only unless the statute or rule expressly provides 
otherwise . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
411. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (identifying New Mexico, Oklahoma and 
Florida as only three states with constitutional savings clauses). 
412. See infra notes 413–35 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional retroactivity 
clauses). 
413. See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 47–51 (compiling constitutional retroactivity clauses). 
414. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11 (emphasis added). 
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ex post facto clause.”415  Retroactivity clauses such as these present no 
impediment to retroactive death penalty-repeal legislation, which 
necessarily involves the reduction of criminal sentences.416 
A second type of constitutional retroactivity clause applies to 
criminal laws, but only to the extent that such laws impose harsher 
punishments than prior law.  These retroactivity clauses are, in effect, 
ex post facto clauses, prohibiting more onerous—not ameliorative—
criminal laws.417  Maryland’s constitution, for example, states that 
“retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of 
 
415. People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 192 (Colo. 1992).  Georgia and Missouri 
similarly interpret their constitutional retroactivity clauses to prohibit retroactive civil—not 
criminal—laws.  See, e.g., Evans v. State, 314 S.E.2d 421, 428 (Ga. 1984) (“[T]he history of our 
state Constitution shows that the term ‘retroactive law’ applies exclusively to constitutional 
challenges to civil statutes.”); State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (“[T]he 
retrospective clause of article I, section 13 does not apply to criminal laws. . . .  [T]he ex post 
facto clause and the clause prohibiting any law retrospective in its operation in article I, section 
13 have separate and distinct legal meanings, whereby the ex post facto clause applies to 
determine the validity of criminal laws and the clause prohibiting any law retrospective in its 
operation applies to determine the validity of laws affecting civil rights and remedies.”); see also 
Mitchell, supra note 36, at n.21 (“[T]he use of the constitutional retroactive clause to prevent 
[ameliorative] changes has been applied mostly in the civil law context.”).  The Texas Supreme 
Court “assum[ed] without deciding that [the Texas Constitution’s] proscription against retroactive 
legislation is applicable to criminal cases.”  Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1991) (en banc); see infra notes 427–29 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’ 
constitutional retroactivity clause). 
416. Idaho and Montana’s constitutions likewise prohibit “retroactive” and “retrospective” 
laws, respectively, but appear to do so only in the civil context, as demonstrated by the placement 
of such clauses.  Compare IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16 (stating, in “Declaration of Rights” article, 
that “[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall 
ever be passed”), with IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 12 (stating, in “Corporations, Public and Private” 
section, that “[t]he legislature shall pass no law for the benefit of a railroad, or other corporation, 
or any individual, or association of individuals retroactive in its operation” (emphasis added)).  
The placement of Idaho’s retroactivity clause suggests that it applies to civil laws impacting 
corporations, not criminal laws impacting individuals.  See Neil Colman McCabe & Cynthia Ann 
Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 133, 
140 (1991) (stating that Idaho’s retroactivity provision “seem[s] more akin to state constitutional 
prohibition[s] on special or local legislation than to [a] broad ban[] on retroactive civil laws”).  
Nevertheless, to the extent that the retroactivity clause applies to retroactive criminal legislation, 
it most likely does not apply to ameliorative criminal legislation because such legislation does not 
impose “a new liability.”  IDAHO CONST. art. X, § 12.  Montana’s constitutional retroactivity 
clause most likely does not apply to ameliorative criminal legislation for similar reasons.  
Compare MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31 (stating, in “Declaration of Rights” article, that “[n]o ex post 
facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be passed by the 
legislature”), with MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (stating, in “Non-municipal corporations” section, 
that “[t]he legislature shall pass no law retrospective in its operations which imposes on the 
people a new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already passed” (emphasis 
added)). 
417. Cf. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977) (“It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex 
post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.”). 
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such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive, unjust 
and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to 
be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or 
required.”418  Maryland’s prohibition on “retrospective laws” thus 
explicitly refers to ex post facto laws.419  As Maryland’s high court has 
made clear, “[t]he retrospective nature of a law, or its applicability to 
pre-existing cases does not make it unconstitutional, unless it . . . is ‘ex 
post facto within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, 
or of our Declaration of Rights.’”420 
The New Hampshire Constitution likewise applies to criminal laws, 
and states that “[r]etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, 
and unjust.  No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the 
decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses.”421  In the 
criminal context, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear 
that the clause “forbids ex post facto penal laws”—not laws that 
mitigate punishment.422  According to the court, “[t]he only object of 
[the ex post facto] clause in the bill of rights was to protect individuals 
against unjust and oppressive punishment.  Therefore, while it 
withholds the power to make retrospective laws for the punishment of 
offences, it leaves to the legislature the power to make such laws, at its 
discretion, for the mitigation of punishment.”423 
As the Maryland and New Hampshire constitutions make clear, this 
second type of retroactivity clause does not prohibit retroactive death 
penalty-repeal legislation because such legislation is not ex post 
facto.424  Retroactive death penalty-repeal legislation does not “make[] 
 
418. MD. CONST. art. XVII. 
419. Id. 
420. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 890 A.2d 310, 327 (Md. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted); see John Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 137 (Md. 
2013) (stating that Maryland’s constitutional retroactivity clause “is not implicated in purely civil 
matters. . . .  [I]n Maryland, the prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal cases”) 
(internal citations omitted).  North Carolina’s constitutional retroactivity clause, contained in a 
section of its Declaration of Rights entitled, “Ex Post Facto Laws,” parallels that of Maryland and 
has likewise been interpreted to forbid ex post facto laws.  N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16; see, e.g., 
State v. Whitaker, 700 S.E.2d 215, 216–17 (N.C. 2010) (stating that federal Ex Post Facto Clause 
and North Carolina’s constitutional retroactivity clause “preserve the right of the people to be free 
from ex post facto laws”). 
421. N.H. CONST. Pt. I, Art. 23; see State v. Comeau, 697 A.2d 497, 500 (N.H. 1997) (“We 
have long recognized that this constitutional provision contains two distinct branches—civil and 
criminal.”). 
422. State v. Matthews, 951 A.2d 155, 157 (N.H. 2008). 
423. Id. at 158 (quoting Woart v. Winneck, 3 N.H. 473, 476 (1826)). 
424. See supra notes 417–25 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland’s and New 
Hampshire’s constitutional retroactivity clauses). 
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more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its 
enactment”; quite the opposite, it reduces the punishment for such 
crimes.425 
A third type of constitutional retroactivity clause extends to criminal 
laws but sweeps more broadly than ex post facto clauses.  Only two 
states appear to have such clauses: Texas and Ohio.426  The Texas 
Constitution states that “[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, 
retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall 
be made.”427  In Grimes v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
held that the Texas Constitution’s retroactivity clause did not prohibit 
retroactive application of a statute that eliminated retrial for wrongly 
sentenced defendants and instead required reformation of the judgment 
on appeal.428  The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that, although 
the Texas Constitution “not only prohibits ex post facto legislation but 
also prohibits any ‘retroactive’ legislation,” the clause was not 
“applicable to statutes merely affecting matters of procedure which do 
not disturb vested, substantive rights.”429 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that Ohio’s 
constitutional prohibition on “retroactive laws” is “a much stronger 
prohibition” than the prohibition on ex post facto laws.430  As in Texas, 
Ohio courts have concluded that their constitutional retroactivity clause 
is not violated unless the new law “reach[es] back in time and create[s] 
new burdens, deprivations, or impairments of vested rights.”431  In State 
v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Ohio gave retroactive effect to a law that 
 
425. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36 
(1981)). 
426. See infra notes 427–29 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’ and Ohio’s 
constitutional retroactivity clauses). 
427. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). 
428. Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582, 587–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 
429. Id. at 587; see Ex parte Abahosh, 561 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“The 
Texas Constitution goes further than the United States Constitution for the former is not confined 
to forbidding ex post facto laws, i.e., retroactive penal legislation, but it also lays a ban on any 
retroactive law.  In prohibiting retroactive laws, the Texas Constitution seeks to safeguard rights 
not guaranteed by other constitutional provisions.” (citing Mellinger v. City of Houston, 3 S.W. 
249 (1887))). 
430. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 495 n.5 (Ohio 1988), superseded 
on other grounds, R.C. 2745.01 (interpreting OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28). 
431. State v. Davis, 9 N.E. 3d 1031, 1044 (Ohio 2014) (quoting Bielat v. Bielat, 721 N.E.2d 
28, 32 (Ohio 2000)); accord. State v. White, 972 N.E.2d 534, 546 (Ohio 2012) (“[T]he creation 
of a new right—even a new substantive right—is not, by itself, enough to support a claim of 
unconstitutional retroactivity.  We have held that a claim that a statute is substantive, and hence 
unconstitutionally retroactive, ‘cannot be based solely upon evidence that a statute retrospectively 
created a new right, but must also include a showing of some impairment, burden, deprivation, or 
new obligation accompanying that new right.’” (citation omitted)). 
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allowed capital offenders whose death sentences had been set aside to 
be resentenced to death.432  According to the Davis court, the new law 
did not violate Ohio’s retroactivity clause because it did not “increase 
[the offender’s] potential sentence,” “impair any vested or accrued 
rights,” violate “a reasonable expectation of finality,” or “impose any 
new burden on [him].”433 
Because retroactive death penalty repeal legislation safeguards—
rather than takes away—death row prisoners’ liberty and life interests, it 
is unlikely that such legislation is prohibited by the constitutional 
retroactivity clauses contained in the Texas and Ohio constitutions.434  
Indeed, if retroactively permitting a prisoner to be resentenced to death 
or retroactively depriving a prisoner of a new trial does not offend a 
retroactivity clause, it seems even less likely that reducing a prisoner’s 
sentence would.435 
VI.  MODEL RETROACTIVE DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS 
Having canvassed the various constitutional impediments to 
retroactive death penalty repeal, this Part provides four model statutory 
provisions that state legislatures should consider when repealing the 
death penalty retroactively. 
 
432. Davis, 9 N.E. 3d at 1044–45. 
433. Id. 
434. See supra notes 427–29 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’ and Ohio’s 
constitutional retroactivity clauses). 
435. See id. (discussing Grimes and Davis).  The Tennessee Constitution contains separate 
clauses prohibiting “retrospective law[s],” on the one hand, and ex post facto laws, on the other.  
Compare TENN. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Ex Post Facto Laws”), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20 
(“Retrospective laws; impairment of contracts”).  Although the establishment of these two 
separate clauses would appear to suggest that Tennessee’s constitutional retroactivity clause is 
more protective than its ex post facto clause, Tennessee courts have not interpreted the clauses 
this way.  Instead, courts have construed Tennessee’s constitutional retroactivity clause as 
creating a presumption against retroactivity that can be overcome by the clear intent of the 
legislature.  See, e.g., State v. Hayes, No. M2012–01768–CCA–R3–CD, 2013 WL 3378320, at 
*6–8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2013) (“Under the Tennessee Constitution, ‘no retrospective 
law . . . shall be made.’  Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 20.  Therefore, unless the legislature clearly 
indicates otherwise, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively.”).  When invalidating 
retroactive criminal laws, Tennessee courts generally rely on the ex post facto clause—not the 
retroactivity clause.  See, e.g., State v. Odom, 137 S.W. 3d 572, 582–83 (Tenn. 2004) (holding 
that retroactive application of law that allowed admission of facts underlying prior conviction for 
purposes of establishing aggravating circumstance in death penalty case violated state ex post 
facto clause, without discussion of state retroactivity clause); Hayes, 2013 WL 3378320, at *7–8 
(holding that retroactive application of law that allowed admission of previously inadmissible 
evidence against defendant violated federal and state ex post facto clauses, but not the state 
retroactivity clause). 
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A.  Model Retroactivity Provision in Pending and Final Cases 
Generally speaking, neither the separation of powers nor any other 
constitutional concern prohibits the legislature from repealing the death 
penalty in pending cases—i.e., those in which the person has not 
received a sentence of death and exhausted all direct appeals.436  The 
following provision would provide for mandatory retroactivity in 
pending cases: “No person shall be executed, irrespective of whether the 
crime was committed, the conviction had, or the sentence imposed, 
before or after the effective date of this act.”437 
Depending on which line of authority a court chooses to rely on, the 
separation of powers may prohibit the legislature from repealing the 
death penalty in final cases, i.e., reducing final death sentences to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.438  The following two 
provisions, drawn from federal and state capital and non-capital repeal 
legislation, are the most promising options for reducing final death 
sentences.  The first option, heeding the holding of Plaut, authorizes 
(but does not require) the judiciary to reduce final death sentences: 
In any case where a person was sentenced to death prior to the 
effective date of this act and exhausted all appeals, a court that 
imposed a death sentence may, on motion of the defendant, the 
Department of Corrections [or similar executive agency], the attorney 
for the State, or the court, impose a sentence of imprisonment in the 
state prison for life without the possibility of parole.  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence 
pursuant to this section.439 
In recognition of the majority rule invalidating the reduction of final 
sentences as a violation of the executive’s commutation power, the 
second option authorizes (but does not require) the executive to reduce 
final sentences: 
 
436. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995) (stating that legislature can 
enact laws that retroactively apply to pending cases so long as its intent is clear).  There is a 
remote possibility that constitutional savings clauses in Florida, New Mexico, and Oklahoma 
could be interpreted to prohibit retroactive death penalty repeal in pending cases.  See supra Part 
V.A (discussing Florida’s, New Mexico’s, and Oklahoma’s constitutional savings clauses). 
437. This provision is based on West Virginia’s death penalty repeal legislation.  Act of Mar. 
12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 203, 207. 
438. See supra Parts III.B.1 (discussing federal authority regarding infringement of final 
judgments), III.C (discussing state authority regarding infringement of final judgments), and IV 
(discussing state authority regarding infringement of pardon power) and accompanying text. 
439. This provision is adapted from the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, supra note 43, and 
SAFE California Act § 10(b), supra note 39.  For other examples, see supra note 41 (compiling 
retroactive death penalty repeal legislation). 
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The Board of Pardons and Paroles [or similar executive agency] shall 
review the sentence of any person who was sentenced to death prior to 
the effective date of this act and has exhausted all appeals, and, in its 
discretion, the Board may change a sentence of death into a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole.  Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to require the Board of Pardons and Parole [or similar 
executive agency] to change any sentence pursuant to this section or to 
otherwise limit its power under the [state] Constitution.440 
B.  Model Finding 
In Dorsey, the Supreme Court suggested that, while Congress could 
have made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to final drug sentences, it 
did not intend to do so.441  To make clear to courts that death penalty 
repeal is intended to reduce final death sentences, and that the purpose 
behind such legislation is equality and uniformity in sentencing (as 
opposed to mercy and forgiveness),442 state legislatures should consider 
adding findings like this one from California: “Retroactive application 
of this act will end a costly and ineffective practice, free up law 
enforcement resources to increase the rate at which homicide and rape 
cases are solved, and achieve fairness, equality and uniformity in 
sentencing.”443 
C.  Model Provision Making General Savings 
Statute Inapplicable 
As further support for the legislature’s intent to reduce final death 
sentences, state legislatures should clarify that the state’s general 
savings statute, which creates a presumption against retroactivity, does 
not apply to the repeal.444  States can do so by adding a provision 
stating that, “This act shall be given full force and effect, 
notwithstanding the provisions of [the state’s general savings 
statute].”445 
 
440. This provision is adapted from the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, supra note 43, The 
SAFE California Act § 10(b), supra note 39, and New Jersey’s death penalty repeal law, Act of 
Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, § 2, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427, 1429–30, available at http://www.njleg.state 
.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL07/204_.PDF. 
441. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012) (suggesting that Congress 
could have eliminated crack cocaine sentencing disparities by “re-opening sentencing 
proceedings concluded prior to [the] new law’s effective date,” but it did not do so). 
442. See supra notes 314–44 and accompanying text (discussing Way and Kent County line of 
cases). 
443. This provision is based on the SAFE California Act § 2(10), supra note 39. 
444. See supra Part I (discussing general savings statute’s presumption against retroactivity). 
445. By contrast, in order to avoid retroactive application of its death penalty repeal statute, 
the Connecticut legislature added a provision stating that its general savings statute did apply to 
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D.  Model Severability Clause 
If a court were to find retroactive death penalty repeal 
unconstitutional, it would probably do one of two things.  It might 
“sever” the retroactivity provision, thereby giving effect to the 
remainder of the repeal (i.e., eliminating the death penalty only for 
those who commit crimes post-repeal).  Alternatively, the court might 
decide that the provision cannot be severed and strike down the entire 
repeal, effectively reinstating the death penalty.446 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of retroactive 
death penalty repeal and the risk that a court will strike down the entire 
repeal if its retroactive language is declared unconstitutional, it is 
imperative that the legislature add to the retroactive repeal bill’s text a 
severability provision that makes clear that the bill’s retroactivity 
provision is severable.  A severability clause is especially important if 
the legislation mandates the reduction of final sentences (as opposed to 
making such reduction discretionary).  The severability clause in 
California’s repeal bill provides a useful example: 
The provisions of this act are severable.  If any provision of this act or 
its application is held invalid, including but not limited to [the 
retroactivity provision], that invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision 
or application.447 
 
the repeal.  See Connecticut General Statute § 53a–54e (2012) (“The provisions of subsection (t) 
of section 1-1 and section 54-194 [i.e., Connecticut’s general savings statutes] shall apply and be 
given full force and effect with respect to a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, 
under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012.”). 
446. This latter argument has been advanced by the State of Connecticut in a case challenging 
the constitutionality of Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal.  State’s Resp. to Supp’l Brief of 
Def. at 41, State v. Santiago (Conn. Jan. 14, 2012) (S.C. 17413) (“[I]f this Court strikes [the death 
penalty repeal statute] in its entirety, [the prior statute] would be revived, thereby restoring capital 
punishment as it existed before passage of the [repeal statute].”); see State’s Response to Petition 
for Writ of Superintending Control at 2, Astorga v. State (N.M. Jan. 27, 2011) (No. 32,744) 
(arguing that if court were to declare prospective-only language unconstitutional, “the only 
remedy available to th[e] Court is to strike down the entire statute, which would have the effect of 
reinstating the [death penalty].”). 
447. This provision is based on the SAFE California Act § 12, supra note 39.  By contrast, in 
2012, the Connecticut legislature considered (and ultimately rejected) an amendment that would 
have added a non-severability provision.  In contrast to California’s severability provision, the 
failed Connecticut amendment would have rendered Connecticut’s repeal “inoperative” and of 
“no effect” if “any sentence imposed . . . is reduced or invalidated on the basis of the 
[prospective-only repeal].”  Sen. Amendment LCO 3058 to Senate Bill 280, An Act Revising the 
Penalty for Capital Felonies (Conn. Feb. Sess. 2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/ 
amd/S/2012SB-00280-R00SD-AMD.htm. 
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CONCLUSION 
The opening of the twenty-first century has witnessed a flurry of 
death penalty repeals.  This development is encouraging, but only partly 
so.  Amidst the cheers for abolition, there is an unfairness of the highest 
order: the maintenance of the death penalty for some but not others for 
no other reason than the date of their crimes.  State legislatures are 
repealing the death penalty prospectively only, and the executive is 
leaving those prisoners on death row.  In New Mexico and Connecticut, 
a total of thirteen prisoners remain on death row after those states 
abolished the death penalty.  One of those prisoners is Richard 
Rozkowski, who was sentenced to death on May 22, 2014—over two 
years after Connecticut abolished its death penalty in 2012.  His lawyers 
argued that this was unfair, and they were right.  But it was not 
unconstitutional.  States can constitutionally repeal the death penalty 
prospectively only. 
Some states, however, are “going retro.”  In New Hampshire and 
Delaware, legislators have attempted without success to make their 
repeal bills retroactive.  In California, a retroactive bill that would have 
reduced the sentences of over 700 death row prisoners narrowly missed 
passage on a 53%–47% vote of the electorate. 
More states should attempt to pass retroactive death penalty repeals, 
but they are not doing so.  There are two reasons for this.  The first is 
political—legislators are not pursuing retroactive legislation because 
they do not have the votes.  The opposition of victims’ family members 
has proven too strong to permit some legislators to reduce existing death 
sentences.  The second reason is legal.  Legislators are not pursuing 
retroactive legislation—not because they do not have the votes, but 
because they do not believe that their state constitutions permit it.  
Separation of powers concerns and constitutional prohibitions on 
retroactive legislation, they argue, prevent them from extending repeal 
to those who committed their crimes before repeal.  These arguments 
are reasonable ones, and they extend far beyond the death penalty 
sphere—to retroactive crack sentencing laws and retroactive juvenile 
LWOP sentencing laws, among others. 
This Article analyzed three primary constitutional concerns and 
demonstrated why none should prevent legislators from retroactively 
repealing the death penalty.  First, the reduction of final death sentences 
does not offend the separation of powers by interfering with the final 
judgments of courts.  Supreme Court authority prohibiting Congress 
from reopening final civil judgments is distinguishable, and recent cases 
from the Supreme Court and lower federal courts support the reopening 
of final judgments in criminal cases.  In addition, the reopening of final 
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criminal judgments furthers liberty interests at the very heart of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.  And, even if the separation of powers 
prohibits the legislature from requiring courts to reopen final 
judgments, it does not prohibit them from merely authorizing it.  Lastly, 
state court decisions, on balance, support the constitutionality of 
legislation that reduces final sentences.  In the three states that have 
looked closely at the issue, two have decisions upholding such 
legislation where it benefits—not burdens—the private rights of 
individuals and encourages equality and uniformity in sentencing.  
Second, the reduction of final sentences does not offend the separation 
of powers by interfering with the executive’s commutation authority.  
Although a majority of jurisdictions has held that sentence reduction is 
the same as commutation and therefore violates the separation of 
powers, a strong minority of jurisdictions has persuasively held 
otherwise.  In contrast to the formalism of the majority view, courts in 
the minority have concluded that sentence reduction is different from 
commutation in both purpose and effect, and is therefore constitutional.  
This less-restrictive interpretation of the separation of powers is the 
better one for still more reasons, including the existence of 
constitutional safeguards such as the governor’s veto power, the 
furtherance of consistency between pending and final cases, and 
favorable authority at the federal level. 
And third, retroactive death penalty repeal does not offend savings 
and retroactivity clauses in the small number of state constitutions 
containing them.  To the extent that these clauses facially apply to 
ameliorative criminal laws, they have not prevented legislatures from 
passing legislation that retroactively reduced penalties, nor have they 
prevented courts from upholding such legislation. 
In sum, while politics may prevent legislatures from pursuing 
retroactive repeal of the death penalty, the law should not.  The law 
permits retroactive repeal of the death penalty and, as California’s 2012 
repeal bill makes clear, “fairness, equality, and uniformity” demand it.  
The next decade will undoubtedly see more states boarding the abolition 
train.  Hopefully, they will take their death rows with them.  Abolition 
for all. 
